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Abstract
We focus on a family of quantum coin-flipping protocols based on quantum bit-commitment.
We discuss how the semidefinite programming formulations of cheating strategies can be re-
duced to optimizing a linear combination of fidelity functions over a polytope. These turn
out to be much simpler semidefinite programs which can be modelled using second-order cone
programming problems. We then use these simplifications to construct their point games as de-
veloped by Kitaev by exploiting the structure of optimal dual solutions.
We also study a family of classical coin-flipping protocols based on classical bit-commitment.
Cheating strategies for these classical protocols can be formulated as linear programs which are
closely related to the semidefinite programs for the quantum version. In fact, we can construct
point games for the classical protocols as well using the analysis for the quantum case.
We discuss the philosophical connections between the classical and quantum protocols and
their point games as viewed from optimization theory. In particular, we observe an analogy
between a spectrum of physical theories (from classical to quantum) and a spectrum of con-
vex optimization problems (from linear programming to semidefinite programming, through
second-order cone programming). In this analogy, classical systems correspond to linear pro-
gramming problems and the level of quantum features in the system is correlated to the level
of sophistication of the semidefinite programming models on the optimization side.
Concerning security analysis, we use the classical point games to prove that every classi-
cal protocol of this type allows exactly one of the parties to entirely determine the coin-flip.
Using the intricate relationship between the semidefinite programming based quantum proto-
col analysis and the linear programming based classical protocol analysis, we show that only
“classical” protocols can saturate Kitaev’s lower bound for strong coin-flipping. Moreover, if
the product of Alice and Bob’s optimal cheating probabilities is 1/2, then exactly one party can
perfectly control the outcome of the protocol. This rules out quantum protocols of this type
from attaining the optimal level of security.
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1 Introduction
Security levels of quantum coin-flipping protocols as well as classical coin-flipping protocols can
be modelled and analyzed via utilization of convex optimization theory. In particular, the cheating
strategies determining the security level of such quantum protocols can be modelled by semidef-
inite programming problems. In this paper, we deeply explore this connection by examining an
algebraic construct known as point games. These point games are constructed from feasible dual
solutions and, in this sense, are dual to the notion of protocols. We fully flesh out the details of
these connections for a specific class of protocols and discuss how these connections extend to the
classical version as well. We then discuss the philosophical ideas behind these connections and
show some theoretical implications.
Being able to interpret dual solutions to optimization problems has been very fruitful, even
in the very special case of linear programming problems. Such interpretations typically lead to a
deeper understanding of the behaviour of optimal solutions and better formulations of optimiza-
tion problems modelling related phenomena.
1.1 Quantum coin-flipping
Coin-flipping is a classic cryptographic task introduced by Blum [Blu81]. In this task, two remotely
situated parties, Alice and Bob, would like to agree on a uniformly random bit by communicating
with each other. The complication is that neither party trusts the other. If Alice were to toss a coin
and send the outcome to Bob, Bob would have no means to verify whether this was a uniformly
random outcome. In particular, if Alice wishes to cheat, she could send the outcome of her choice
without any possibility of being caught cheating. We are interested in a communication protocol
that is designed to protect an honest party from being cheated.
More precisely, a “strong coin-flipping protocol” with bias  is a two-party communication
protocol in the style of Yao [Yao79, Yao93]. In the protocol, the two players, Alice and Bob, start
with no inputs and compute a value cA, cB ∈ {0, 1}, respectively, or declare that the other player is
cheating. If both players are honest, i.e., follow the protocol, then they agree on the outcome of the
protocol (cA = cB), and the coin toss is fair (Pr(cA = cB = b) = 1/2, for any b ∈ {0, 1}). Moreover,
if one of the players deviates arbitrarily from the protocol in his or her local computation, i.e.,
is “dishonest” (and the other party is honest), then the probability of either outcome 0 or 1 is at
most 1/2 + . Other variants of coin-flipping have also been studied in the literature. However, in
the rest of the article, by “coin-flipping” (without any modifiers) we mean strong coin flipping.
A straightforward game-theoretic argument proves that if the two parties in a coin-flipping
protocol communicate classically and are computationally unbounded, at least one party can cheat
perfectly (with bias 1/2). In other words, there is at least one party, say Bob, and at least one out-
come b ∈ {0, 1} such that Bob can ensure outcome b with probability 1 by choosing his messages
in the protocol appropriately. Consequently, classical coin-flipping protocols with bias  < 1/2
are only possible under complexity-theoretic assumptions, and when Alice and Bob have limited
computational resources.
The use of quantum communication offers the possibility of “unconditionally secure” cryp-
tography, wherein the security of a protocol rests solely on the validity of quantum mechanics
as a faithful description of nature. The first few proposals for quantum information processing,
namely the Wiesner quantum money scheme [Wie83] and the Bennett-Brassard quantum key ex-
pansion protocol [BB84] were motivated by precisely this idea. These schemes were eventually
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shown to be unconditionally secure in principle [May01, LC99, PS00, MVW12]. In light of these
results, several researchers have studied the possibility of quantum coin-flipping protocols, as a
step towards studying more general secure multi-party computations.
Lo and Chau [LC97] and Mayers [May97] were the first to consider quantum protocols for coin-
flipping without any computational assumptions. They proved that no protocol with a finite num-
ber of rounds could achieve 0 bias. Nonetheless, Aharonov, Ta-Shma, Vazirani, and Yao [ATVY00]
designed a simple, three-round quantum protocol that achieved bias ≈ 0.4143 < 1/2. This is im-
possible classically, even with an unbounded number of rounds. Ambainis [Amb01] designed a
protocol with bias 1/4 a` la Aharonov et al., and proved that it is optimal within a class (see also
Refs. [SR01, KN04] for a simpler version of the protocol and a complete proof of security). Shortly
thereafter, Kitaev [Kit02] proved that any strong coin-flipping protocol with a finite number of
rounds of communication has bias at least (
√
2− 1)/2 ≈ 0.207 (see Ref. [GW07] for an alternative
proof). Kitaev’s seminal work uses semidefinite optimization in a central way. This argument
extends to protocols with an unbounded number of rounds. This remained the state of the art for
several years, with inconclusive evidence in either direction as to whether 1/4 = 0.25 or (
√
2−1)/2
is optimal. In 2009, Chailloux and Kerenidis [CK09] settled this question through an elegant pro-
tocol scheme that has bias at most (
√
2−1)/2 + δ for any δ > 0 of our choice (building on [Moc07],
see below). We refer to this as the CK protocol.
The CK protocol uses breakthrough work by Mochon [Moc07], which itself builds upon the
“point game” framework proposed by Kitaev. Mochon shows there are weak coin-flipping proto-
cols with arbitrarily small bias. This work has since been simplified by experts on the topic; see
e.g. [ACG+14].) A weak coin-flipping protocol is a variant of coin-flipping in which each party
favours a distinct outcome, say Alice favours 0 and Bob favours 1. The requirement when they
are honest is the same as before. We say it has bias  if the following condition holds. When Alice
is dishonest and Bob honest, we only require that Bob’s outcome is 0 (Alice’s favoured outcome)
with probability at most 1/2 + . A similar condition to protect Alice holds, when she is honest
and Bob is dishonest. The weaker requirement of security against a dishonest player allows us to
circumvent the Kitaev lower bound. While Mochon’s work pins down the optimal bias for weak
coin-flipping, it does this in a non-constructive fashion: we only know of the existence of protocols
with arbitrarily small bias, not of its explicit description. Moreover, the number of rounds tends to
infinity as the bias decreases to 0. As a consequence, the CK protocol for strong coin-flipping is
also existential, and the number of rounds tends to infinity as the bias decreases to (
√
2− 1)/2. It
is perhaps very surprising that no progress on finding better explicit protocols has been made in
over a decade.
1.2 Our results
To state our results, we introduce the following four quantities:
P ∗B,c: The maximum probability with which a dishonest Bob can force an honest Alice to out-
put c ∈ {0, 1} by digressing from protocol.
P ∗A,c: The maximum probability with which a dishonest Alice can force an honest Bob to out-
put c ∈ {0, 1} by digressing from protocol.
We define a family of quantum coin-flipping protocols based on bit-commitment which we call
BCCF-protocols. These protocols are parameterized by four probability distributions α0, α1 de-
fined on a finite set A and β0, β1 defined on a finite set B. We formulate the cheating strategies for
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Alice and Bob forcing an outcome of 0 or 1 as semidefinite programs in the style of Kitaev [Kit02].
It can then be shown that the optimal cheating probabilities of a cheating Alice and a cheating Bob
can be written as the maximization of a linear combination of fidelity functions over respective
polytopesPA andPB (this was also proved in our previous work [NST14] using direct arguments).
For example,
P ∗A,0 = max
12 ∑
a∈{0,1}
∑
y∈B
βa,y F(s
(a,y), αa) : (s1, . . . , sn, s) ∈ PA
 ,
where s(a,y) is the projection of s onto the fixed indices a and y, and
P ∗B,1 = max
12 ∑
a∈{0,1}
F
(
(αa ⊗ IB)>pn, βa¯
)
: (p1, . . . , pn) ∈ PB
 .
(See Theorems 3.4 and 3.7 for formal statements of Bob’s and Alice’s cheating probabilities, re-
spectively.) We discuss how these optimization problems can be written as semidefinite programs
(which are much simpler than the original formulations) and, furthermore, it was noted in [NST14]
that one can use second-order cone programming to model such optimization problems. We remark
why this is interesting below.
Using the above semidefinite programs, we develop the point games [Moc07, ACG+14] cor-
responding to a BCCF-protocol, which we call BCCF-point games. We then prove connections
between the cheating probabilities in BCCF-protocols and the final point
[
ζB,1, ζA,0
]
of a BCCF-
point game. More precisely, we prove that the final point
[
ζB,1, ζA,0
]
of any BCCF-point game
satisfies P ∗A,0 ≤ ζA,0 and P ∗B,1 ≤ ζB,1 in the corresponding BCCF-protocol and there exist point
games with final point
[
P ∗B,1, P
∗
A,0
]
. To bound all four cheating probabilities in a BCCF-protocol,
we consider the point games in pairs, one of which bounds P ∗A,0 and P
∗
B,1 and the other bounds
P ∗A,1 and P
∗
B,0. More precisely, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 1.1 ((Informal) See Theorem 4.8 for a formal statement) Suppose
[
ζB,1, ζA,0
]
is the final
point of a BCCF-point game and
[
ζB,0, ζA,1
]
is the final point of its pair. Then
P ∗B,0 ≤ ζB,0, P ∗B,1 ≤ ζB,1, P ∗A,0 ≤ ζA,0, and P ∗A,1 ≤ ζA,1.
Moreover, there exists a pair of BCCF-point games with final points
[
P ∗B,1, P
∗
A,0
]
and
[
P ∗B,0, P
∗
A,1
]
.
This is a restatement of weak duality/strong duality of semidefinite programming in the con-
text of protocols and point games. We discuss these connections in Section 4.
Our analysis of the quantum protocols shows similarities to a related family of classical coin-
flipping protocols based on bit-commitment, which we call classical BCCF-protocols. We can
write the maximum cheating probabilities of these classical protocols in a very similar way, but
using linear programming instead of semidefinite programming or second-order cone program-
ming. For example, we can write
P ∗A,0 = max
12 ∑
a∈A′0
∑
y∈B
∑
x∈supp(αa)
βa,ysa,x,y : (s1, . . . , sn, s) ∈ PA

5
and
P ∗B,1 = max
12 ∑
a∈A′0
∑
y∈supp(βa¯)
∑
x∈A
αa,x pn,x,y : (p1, . . . , pn) ∈ PB
 .
Using the similarities to the quantum case, we develop their point games as well which we call
classical BCCF-point games. Considering them in pairs, we have the classical version of Theo-
rem 1.1, below.
Theorem 1.2 ((Informal) See Theorem 5.4 for a formal statement) Suppose
[
ζB,1, ζA,0
]
is the final
point of a classical BCCF-point game and
[
ζB,0, ζA,1
]
is the final point of its pair. Then
P ∗B,0 ≤ ζB,0, P ∗B,1 ≤ ζB,1, P ∗A,0 ≤ ζA,0, and P ∗A,1 ≤ ζA,1,
whereP ∗B,0, P
∗
B,1, P
∗
A,0, P
∗
A,1 are the maximum cheating probabilities for the classical BCCF-protocol. More-
over, there exists a pair of classical BCCF-point games with final points
[
P ∗B,1, P
∗
A,0
]
and
[
P ∗B,0, P
∗
A,1
]
.
The relationships between the quantum and classical versions of the BCCF-protocols and
BCCF-point games are illustrated in Figure 1 below.
Quantum Protocol
Bob’s SDP
Alice’s SDP
Bob’s Dual SDP
Alice’s Dual SDP
Quantum Point Game
Cheating
Duality
Solutions
Classical Protocol
Bob’s LP
Alice’s LP
Bob’s Dual LP
Alice’s Dual LP
Classical Point Game
Measurement
Polytope Restricted F.R.
Point Splitting
(Quantum) SDP/SOCP
(Classical) LP
Setting
Primal Dual
Duality
Figure 1: Crystal structure of BCCF-protocols. F.R. denotes “feasible region”, SDP abbreviates
“semidefinite programming”, SOCP abbreviates “second-order cone programming”, and LP ab-
breviates “linear programming”.
This figure gives a nice philosophical view of how the generalization of quantum mechanics
from classical mechanics is analogous to the generalization of semidefinite programming from
linear programming. As mentioned previously, it was shown in [NST14] that the optimal cheating
strategies in the quantum version can be formulated using second-order cone programming which is
a special case of semidefinite programming but still a generalization of linear programming (see
Subsection 2.2). This suggests that BCCF-protocols are very simple compared to general quantum
protocols, which is indeed the case. However, they are still provably more general than classical
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protocols. To put another way, just as the simple structure that makes our family of quantum
protocols fit nicely between the set of classical and quantum protocols, the class of optimization
problems that can be modelled as second-order cone programs fits nicely between those that can
be modelled as linear programs and those that can be modelled as semidefinite programs. We
discuss further this analogy and how to view a spectrum of optimization problems between linear
programming and semidefinite programming (and beyond) in Section 5.
Independent of our work and observations above, a similar phenomenon was exposed by
Fiorini, Massar, Pokutta, Tiwary, and de Wolf [FMP+12] in research involving extended linear
programming vs. extended semidefinite programming formulations in combinatorial optimiza-
tion.
Moreover, we can use these relationships to prove theoretical results. In particular, by examin-
ing the classical BCCF-point games, we can prove that at least one party can cheat with probability
1. A closer look reveals that there is no classical BCCF-protocol where both parties can cheat with
probability 1 (which extends to the quantum case as well). This is summarized in the following
theorem.
Theorem 1.3 ((Informal) See Theorem 5.6 for a formal statement) Alice and Bob cannot both cheat
perfectly in a quantum BCCF-protocol. Exactly one of Alice or Bob can cheat perfectly in a classical BCCF-
protocol.
We then address the problem of finding the smallest bias for quantum BCCF-protocols. We
do this by examining what happens when both of Kitaev’s lower bounds P ∗A,0P
∗
B,0 ≥ 1/2 and
P ∗A,1P
∗
B,1 ≥ 1/2 are saturated.
Theorem 1.4 ((Informal) See Theorem 6.1 for a formal statement) If a quantum BCCF-protocol sat-
urates both of Kitaev’s lower bounds, then the cheating probabilities are the same as in the corresponding
classical protocol.
We can combine the above two results to use classical protocols to lower bound the quantum bias.
Corollary 1.5 In every quantum BCCF-protocol, we have max{P ∗A,0, P ∗A,1, P ∗B,0, P ∗B,1} > 1/
√
2.
1.3 Organization of the paper
We start with establishing notation and terminology on linear algebra, optimization problems
of interest and some technical lemmas in Section 2. Background on coin-flipping and Kitaev’s
protocol and point game formalisms can be found in Appendix A. In Section 3, we introduce the
family of quantum protocols we consider in this paper and formulate their cheating strategies
using semidefinite programming. The corresponding point games are developed and analyzed in
Section 4. A family of related classical protocols and their point games are examined in Section 5
and used to lower bound the quantum bias in Section 6. We end with conclusions in Section 7.
2 Background
In this section, we establish the notation and the necessary background for this paper.
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2.1 Linear algebra
For a finite set A, we denote by RA, RA+, ProbA, and CA the set of real vectors, nonnegative real
vectors, probability vectors, and complex vectors, respectively, each indexed by A. We use Rn,
Rn+, Probn, and Cn for the special case when A = {1, . . . , n}. We denote by SA and SA+ the set of
Hermitian matrices and positive semidefinite Hermitian matrices, respectively, each over the reals
with columns and rows indexed by A.
It is convenient to define
√
x to be the element-wise square root of a nonnegative vector x. The
element-wise square root of a probability vector yields a unit vector (in the Euclidean norm). This
operation, in some sense, is a conversion of a probability vector to a quantum state. For a vector
p ∈ RA, we denote by Diag(p) ∈ SA the diagonal matrix with p on the diagonal. For a matrix
X ∈ SA, we denote by diag(X) ∈ RA the vector on the diagonal of X . For a vector x ∈ CA, we
denote by supp(x) the set of indices of A where x is nonzero. We denote by x−1 the vector of
inverses, i.e., each entry in the support of x is inverted, and 0 entries are mapped to 0.
For vectors x and y, the notation x ≥ y denotes that x − y has nonnegative entries, x > y
denotes that x − y has positive entries, and for Hermitian matrices X and Y , the notation X  Y
denotes that X − Y is positive semidefinite, and X  Y denotes X − Y is positive definite when
the underlying spaces are clear from context.
The Schur complement of the block matrix X :=
[
A B
C D
]
is S := A − BD−1C. Note that
when D  0 and C = B∗ with A Hermitian, then X  0 if and only if S  0.
The Kronecker product of two matrices X and Y , denoted X ⊗ Y , is defined such that the
i, j’th block is equal to Xi,j · Y . Note that X ⊗ Y ∈ SA×B+ when X ∈ SA+ and Y ∈ SB+ and
Tr(X ⊗ Y ) = Tr(X) · Tr(Y ) when X and Y are square.
The Schatten 1-norm, or trace norm, of a matrix X is defined as
‖X‖1 := Tr(
√
X∗X),
where X∗ is the adjoint of X and
√
X denotes the Hermitian square root of a Hermitian positive
semidefinite matrix X , i.e., the Hermitian positive semidefinite matrix Y such that Y 2 = X . Note
that the 1-norm of a matrix is the sum of its singular values. The 1-norm of a vector p ∈ CA is
defined as
‖x‖1 :=
∑
x∈A
|px|.
For a matrix X , we denote by Null(X) the nullspace of X . We denote by 〈X,Y 〉 the standard
inner product of matrices acting on the same space given by Tr(X∗Y ).
We use the notation a¯ to denote the complement of a bit a with respect to 0 and 1 and a⊕ b to
denote the XOR of the bits a and b. We use Zn2 to denote the set of n-bit binary strings.
A convex set C is a convex cone if λx ∈ C when λ ≥ 0 and x ∈ C. The dual of the convex cone
C, denoted C∗, is the set {y : 〈x, y〉 ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ C}.
A function f : Sn → Sm is said to be operator monotone if
f(X)  f(Y ) when X  Y.
The set of operator monotone functions is a convex cone.
A polyhedron is the solution set of a system of finitely many linear inequalities (or equalities).
A polytope is a bounded polyhedron.
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The (quantum) partial trace overA1, denoted TrA1 , is defined as the unique linear transformation
which satisfies
TrA1(ρ1 ⊗ ρ2) = Tr(ρ1) · ρ2
for all ρ1 ∈ SA1 and ρ2 ∈ SA2 . More explicitly, given any matrix X ∈ SA1×A2 , we have
TrA1(X) :=
∑
x1∈A1
(
e∗x1 ⊗ IA2
)
X (ex1 ⊗ IA2) ,
where {ex1 : x1 ∈ A1} is the standard basis for CA1 . In fact, the definition is independent of the
choice of basis, so long as it is orthonormal. The adjoint of the partial trace is the transformation
Tr∗A(X) = X ⊗ IA.
We also define the classical partial trace over A1, denoted TrA1 : CA1×A2 → CA2 , as the linear
transformation
TrA1(p) = (e
>
A1 ⊗ I) p,
where eA1 is the vector of all ones indexed by x1 ∈ A1. If p is a probability vector over A1 × A2,
then TrA1(p) is the marginal probability vector of p over A2. The adjoint of the classical partial
trace is the transformation Tr∗A(p) = p⊗ eA.
We define the fidelity of two nonnegative vectors p, q ∈ RA+ as
F(p, q) :=
(∑
x∈A
√
px
√
qx
)2
and the fidelity of two positive semidefinite matrices ρ1 and ρ2 as
F(ρ1, ρ2) := ‖√ρ1√ρ2‖21 .
Notice, F(ρ1, ρ2) ≥ 0 with equality if and only if 〈ρ1, ρ2〉 = 0 and, if ρ1 and ρ2 are quantum states,
F(ρ1, ρ2) ≤ 1 with equality if and only if ρ1 = ρ2. An analogous statement can be made for the
fidelity over probability vectors.
Another distance measure is the trace distance. We define the trace distance between two prob-
ability vectors p and q, denoted ∆(p, q), as
∆(p, q) :=
1
2
‖p− q‖1 .
This is also commonly known as the total variation distance. We similarly define the trace distance
between two quantum states ρ1 and ρ2 as
∆(ρ1, ρ2) :=
1
2
‖ρ1 − ρ2‖1 .
Notice ∆(ρ1, ρ2) ≥ 0 with equality if and only if ρ1 = ρ2 and ∆(ρ1, ρ2) ≤ 1 with equality if and only
if 〈ρ1, ρ2〉 = 0. The analogous statement can be made for the trace distance between probability
vectors.
We use the notation eig(X) to denote the set of (distinct) eigenvalues of a matrix X and Π[λ]X to
denote the projection onto the eigenspace of X corresponding to the eigenvalue λ ∈ eig(X).
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2.2 Optimization classes
2.2.1 Semidefinite programming
A natural class of optimization problems when studying quantum information is semidefinite
programming. A semidefinite program, abbreviated as SDP, is an optimization problem with
finitely many Hermitian matrix variables, a linear objective function of these variables, and finitely
many constraints enforcing positive semidefiniteness of some linear functions of these variables.
Every SDP can be put into the following standard form using some elementary reformulation
tricks:
(P) sup 〈C,X〉
subject to A(X) = b,
X ∈ Sn+,
where A : Sn → Rm is linear, C ∈ Sn, and b ∈ Rm. The SDPs that arise in quantum computation
involve optimization over complex matrices. However, they may be transformed to the above
standard form in a straightforward manner, by observing that Hermitian matrices form a real
subspace of the vector space of n × n complex matrices. We remark here that the data defining
the optimization problems in this paper are always real and thus we can restrict ourselves to real
matrix variables without loss of generality.
We can write the dual of (P) as
(D) inf 〈b, y〉
subject to A∗(y)− S = C,
S ∈ Sn+,
where A∗ is the adjoint of A. We refer to (P) as the primal problem and to (D) as its dual. It is
straightforward to verify that the dual of (D) is (P).
We say X is feasible for (P) if it satisfies the constraints A(X) = b and X ∈ Sn+, and (y, S) is
feasible for (D) if A∗(y) − S = C, and S ∈ Sn+. The usefulness of defining the dual in the above
manner is apparent in the following lemmas.
Lemma 2.1 (Weak duality) For every X feasible for (P) and (y, S) feasible for (D) we have
〈C,X〉 ≤ 〈b, y〉.
Using weak duality, we can prove bounds on the optimal objective value of (P) and (D), i.e.,
the objective function value of any primal feasible solution yields a lower bound on (D) and the
objective function value of any dual feasible solution yields an upper bound on (P).
Under mild conditions, we have that the optimal objective values of (P) and (D) coincide.
Lemma 2.2 (Strong duality) If the objective function of (P) is bounded from above on the set of feasible
solutions of (P) and there exists a strictly feasible solution, i.e., there exists X¯  0 such that A(X¯) = b,
then (D) has an optimal solution and the optimal objective values of (P) and (D) coincide.
A strictly feasible solution as in the above lemma is also called a Slater point. Semidefinite pro-
gramming has a powerful and rich duality theory and the interested reader is referred to [WSV00],
[TW12], and the references therein.
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2.2.2 Second-order cone programming
The second-order cone (or Lorentz cone) in Rn, n ≥ 2, is defined as
SOCn :=
{
(x, t) ∈ Rn−1 ⊕ R : t ≥ ‖x‖2
}
.
A second-order cone program, denoted SOCP, is an optimization problem of the form
(P) sup 〈c, x〉
subject to Ax = b,
x ∈ SOCn1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ SOCnk ,
where A is an m × (∑ki=1 nk) matrix, b ∈ Rm, c ∈ R∑ki=1 nk , and k is finite. We say that a feasible
solution x¯ is strictly feasible if x¯ is in the interior of SOCn1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ SOCnk .
An SOCP also has a dual which can be written as
(D) inf 〈b, y〉
subject to A>y − s = c,
s ∈ SOCn1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ SOCnk .
Note that weak duality and strong duality also hold for SOCPs for the above definition of a strictly
feasible solution.
A related cone, called the rotated second-order cone, is defined as
RSOCn :=
{
(a, b, x) ∈ R⊕ R⊕ Rn−2 : a, b ≥ 0, 2ab ≥ ‖x‖22
}
.
Optimizing over the rotated second-order cone is also called second-order cone programming
because (x, t) ∈ SOCn if and only if (t/2, t, x) ∈ RSOCn+1 and (a, b, x) ∈ RSOCn if and only if
(x, a, b, a + b) ∈ SOCn+1 and a, b ≥ 0. In fact, both second-order cone constraints can be cast as
positive semidefinite constraints:
t ≥ ‖x‖2 ⇐⇒
[
t x>
x t I
]
 0 and a, b ≥ 0, 2ab ≥ ‖x‖22 ⇐⇒
[
2a x>
x b I
]
 0.
Despite second-order cone programming being a special case of semidefinite programming,
there are some notable differences. One is that the algorithms for solving second-order cone pro-
grams can be more efficient and robust than those for solving semidefinite programs. We refer the
interested reader to [Stu99, Stu02, Mit03, AG03] and the references therein.
2.2.3 Linear programming
A linear program, denoted LP, is an optimization problem of the form
(P) max 〈c, x〉
subject to Ax = b,
x ∈ Rn+,
where A is an m× n matrix, c ∈ Rn and b ∈ Rm.
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Linear programming is a special case of both second-order cone programming and semidef-
inite programming. This can be seen by casting a nonnegativity constraint t ≥ 0 as the SOC
constraint (0, t) ∈ SOC2. Associated with every linear program is its dual which is defined as
(D) min 〈b, y〉
subject to A>y − s = c,
s ∈ Rn+.
Note that in this special case, we do not require strict feasibility to guarantee strong duality. If a
linear program is feasible and its objective function is bounded over its feasible region, then it and
its dual attain an optimal solution and the optimal values always coincide.
2.3 Technical lemmas
In this subsection, we present a few lemmas which are helpful in the analysis in this paper.
Lemma 2.3 ([NST14]) For every p, q ∈ RA+, we have
F(p, q) = max{〈X,√p√p>〉 : diag(X) = q, X ∈ SA+}.
Note that
F(p, q)= inf
y∈RA
{〈y, q〉 : Diag(y)  √p√p>}= inf
y>0
{〈y, q〉 : 〈y−1, p〉 ≤ 1}= inf
y>0
{〈y, q〉〈y−1, p〉}
by using the observation
Diag(y)  √p√p> ⇐⇒ IA  Diag(y)−1/2√p√p>Diag(y)−1/2 ⇐⇒ 1 ≥
∑
x∈A
px
yx
.
We use this characterization of the inequality Diag(y)  √p√p> several times throughout this
paper.
Notice that F(p, q) = infy>0 {〈y, q〉〈y−1, p〉} is the classical version of Alberti’s Theorem [Alb83],
which states that F(ρ, σ) = infX0 〈X, ρ〉〈X−1, σ〉 for quantum states ρ and σ.
We can apply the same trick above to the inequality Diag(y) ⊗ IA  |ψ〉〈ψ|, when y > 0 to get
the equivalent condition 1 ≥ 〈ψ|Diag(y)−1⊗IA|ψ〉, which works for any |ψ〉 ∈ CA×A. In particular,
we have the following lemma.
Lemma 2.4 For every p ∈ RA+ and |ψ〉 :=
∑
x∈A
√
px |xx〉, we have
{y > 0 : Diag(y)  √p√p>} = {y > 0 : Diag(y)⊗ IA  |ψ〉〈ψ|}.
We also make use of the lemma below.
Lemma 2.5 ([NST14]) For every β0, β1 ∈ ProbB , we have∑
y∈B
max
a∈{0,1}
{βa,y} = 1 + ∆(β0, β1).
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3 A family of quantum coin-flipping protocols
In this section we introduce the coin-flipping protocols examined in this paper. Intuitively, Alice
“commits” to a bit a (in superposition) by creating a state |ψa〉 and revealing its subsystems one
at a time. Bob does the same, he “commits” to a bit b by creating a state |φb〉 and revealing its
subsystems one at a time. Afterwards, they reveal their bits to each other and the outcome of the
protocol is a⊕ b, if they both pass cheat detection.
We now formally define the class of protocols considered in this paper.
Protocol 3.1 (BCCF-protocol [NST14]) A coin-flipping protocol based on bit-commitment, denoted
here as a BCCF-protocol, is specified by four finite sets
A0 := {0, 1}, A := A1 ×A2 × · · · ×An, B0 := {0, 1}, B := B1 ×B2 × · · · ×Bn,
two probability distributions α0, α1 over A, and two probability distributions β0, β1 over B. From these
parameters, we define the quantum states:
|ψ〉 := 1√
2
∑
a∈{0,1}
|aa〉|ψa〉 ∈ CA0×A′0×A×A′ where |ψa〉 :=
∑
x∈A
√
αa,x|xx〉 ∈ CA×A′ ,
|φ〉 := 1√
2
∑
b∈{0,1}
|bb〉|φb〉 ∈ CB0×B′0×B×B′ where |φb〉 :=
∑
y∈B
√
βb,y|yy〉 ∈ CB×B′ ,
and A′0 := A0, A′ := A, B′0 := B0, and B′ := B are copies.
The preparation, communication, and cheat detection of the protocol proceed as follows:
• Alice prepares the state |ψ〉 and Bob prepares the state |φ〉.
• For i from 1 to n: Alice sends CAi to Bob who replies with CBi .
• Alice fully reveals her bit by sending CA′0 . She also sends CA′ which Bob uses later to check if she was
honest. Bob then reveals his bit by sending CB′0 . He also sends CB′ which Alice uses later to check if
he was honest.
• Alice performs the measurement (ΠA,0,ΠA,1,ΠA,abort) on the space SA0×B
′
0×B×B′
+ , where
ΠA,0 :=
∑
b∈{0,1}
|b〉〈b| ⊗ |b〉〈b| ⊗ |φb〉〈φb|, ΠA,1 :=
∑
b∈{0,1}
|b¯〉〈b¯| ⊗ |b〉〈b| ⊗ |φb〉〈φb|,
and ΠA,abort := I−ΠA,0 −ΠA,1.
• Bob performs the measurement (ΠB,0,ΠB,1,ΠB,abort) on the space SB0×A
′
0×A×A′
+ , where
ΠB,0 :=
∑
a∈{0,1}
|a〉〈a| ⊗ |a〉〈a| ⊗ |ψa〉〈ψa|, ΠB,1 :=
∑
a∈{0,1}
|a¯〉〈a¯| ⊗ |a〉〈a| ⊗ |ψa〉〈ψa|,
and ΠB,abort := I−ΠB,0 −ΠB,1. (These last two steps can be interchanged.)
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Alice prepares |ψ〉 ∈ CA0×A′0×A1×A2×A′1×A′2 Bob prepares |φ〉 ∈ CB0×B′0×B1×B2×B′1×B′2
Alice sends CA1 (x1 ∈ A1)
Bob sends CB1 (y1 ∈ B1)
Alice sends CA2 (x2 ∈ A2)
Bob sends CB2 (y2 ∈ B2)
Alice sends CA′0×A′1×A′2 (a ∈ {0, 1} and a copy of x1, x2)
Bob sends CB′0×B′1×B′2 (b ∈ {0, 1} and a copy of y1, y2)
Alice checks if Bob cheated Bob checks if Alice cheated
Alice and Bob output a⊕ b if no cheating is detected
Figure 2: A six-round BCCF-protocol. Alice’s actions are in red and Bob’s actions are in blue.
A six-round BCCF-protocol is depicted in Figure 2. Note that the measurements check two
things. First, it checks whether the outcome, a⊕ b, is 0 or 1. The first two terms determine this, i.e.,
whether a = b or if a 6= b. Second, it checks whether the other party was honest. For example, if
Alice’s measurement projects onto a space where b = 0 and Bob’s messages are not equal to |φ0〉,
then Alice has detected that Bob has cheated and aborts.
As is shown in Figure 2, we shall reserve the notation for indices: a ∈ A0, b ∈ B0, x ∈ A,
xi ∈ Ai, y ∈ B, and yi ∈ Bi. We sometimes omit the sets when it is clear from context.
3.1 Formulating optimal quantum cheating strategies as semidefinite programs
We can formulate strategies for cheating Bob and cheating Alice as semidefinite programs in the
same manner as Kitaev, as discussed in Appendix A. The extent to which Bob can cheat is captured
by the following lemma.
Lemma 3.2 ([NST14]) Bob’s optimal cheating probability for forcing honest Alice to accept the outcome
c ∈ {0, 1} is given by the optimal objective value of the following semidefinite program:
P ∗B,c = sup 〈 ρF ,ΠA,c 〉
subject to TrB1(ρ1) = TrA1 |ψ〉〈ψ|,
TrBj (ρj) = TrAj (ρj−1), ∀j ∈ {2, . . . , n},
TrB′×B′0(ρF ) = TrA′×A′0(ρn),
ρj ∈ SA0×A
′
0×B1×···×Bj×Aj+1×···×An×A′
+ , ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n},
ρF ∈ SA0×B
′
0×B×B′
+ .
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The actions of a cheating Bob and the variables in the SDP are depicted in Figure 3.
Alice prepares |ψ〉 ∈ CA0×A′0×A1×A2×A′1×A′2 Bob does not follow protocol
Bob maintains purifications of ρ1, ρ2, ρF
|ψ〉〈ψ|
TrA1 |ψ〉〈ψ|
ρ1
TrA2(ρ1)
ρ2
TrA′0×A′1×A′2(ρ2)
ρF
Alice sends CA1 (x1 ∈ A1)
Bob sends CB1 (y1 ∈ B1)
Alice sends CA2 (x2 ∈ A2)
Bob sends CB2 (y2 ∈ B2)
Alice sends CA′0×A′1×A′2 (a ∈ {0, 1} and a copy of x1, x2)
Bob sends CB′0×B′1×B′2 (b ∈ {0, 1} and a copy of y1, y2)
Alice checks if Bob cheated Bob simply outputs his desired outcome
Figure 3: Bob cheating in a six-round BCCF-protocol.
We now present a theorem showing that the cheating SDPs can have a certain, restricted form
while retaining the same optimal objective value. At high level, we cut down the algebraic repre-
sentation of the feasible region. Surprisingly, we are able to reformulate the feasible region by a
polytope defined below.
Definition 3.3 We define Bob’s cheating polytope, denoted PB, as the set of vectors (p1, p2, . . . , pn)
satisfying
TrB1(p1) = eA1 ,
TrB2(p2) = p1 ⊗ eA2 ,
...
TrBn(pn) = pn−1 ⊗ eAn ,
pj ∈ RA1×B1×···×Aj×Bj+ , for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n},
where eAj denotes the vector of all ones in the corresponding space CAj .
We now use Bob’s cheating polytope to capture his optimal cheating probabilities.
Theorem 3.4 (Bob’s reduced problems [NST14]) For the BCCF-protocol defined by the parameters
α0, α1 ∈ ProbA and β0, β1 ∈ ProbB , we have
P ∗B,0 = max
12 ∑
a∈{0,1}
F
(
(αa ⊗ IB)>pn, βa
)
: (p1, . . . , pn) ∈ PB

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and
P ∗B,1 = max
12 ∑
a∈{0,1}
F
(
(αa ⊗ IB)>pn, βa¯
)
: (p1, . . . , pn) ∈ PB
 .
We refer to these as Bob’s reduced problems. Note that we sometimes refer to them as Bob’s reduced
SDPs, implying we have replaced the fidelity with its SDP characterization from Lemma 2.3.
The above theorem can also be proved using the fact that the set {λxx∗ : λ > 0} is an extreme
ray of the cone of positive semidefinite matrices. That is, λxx∗ ∈ SA+ for every λ > 0 and, if
X1, X2 ∈ SA+ satisfy X1 +X2 = λxx∗ for some λ > 0, then X1 = λ1 xx∗ and X2 = λ2 xx∗ for some
λ1, λ2 ≥ 0 satisfying λ1 + λ2 = λ. This proof relies on a reduction of the primal problem alone
and can be found in [NST14]. In Appendix D, we give an alternative proof via duality theory
since some of the structure of optimal dual solutions are required for the construction of the point
games in Section 4. In that appendix we also give context to the variables in the cheating polytope
by deriving the corresponding cheating strategy.
In a similar fashion, we formulate cheating strategies for Alice in the lemma below.
Lemma 3.5 ([NST14]) Alice’s optimal cheating probability for forcing honest Bob to accept the outcome
c ∈ {0, 1} is given by the optimal objective value of the following semidefinite program:
P ∗A,c = sup 〈σF ,ΠB,c ⊗ IB′0×B′〉
subject to TrA1(σ1) = |φ〉〈φ|,
TrAj (σj) = TrBj−1(σj−1), ∀j ∈ {2, . . . , n},
TrA′×A′0(σF ) = TrBn(σn),
σj ∈ SB0×B
′
0×A1×···×Aj×Bj×···×Bn×B′
+ , ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n},
σF ∈ SB0×B
′
0×A′0×A×A′×B′
+ .
Similar to cheating Bob, we can reduce the feasible region to a polytope, defined below.
Definition 3.6 We define Alice’s cheating polytope, denoted PA, as the set of vectors (s1, s2, . . . , sn, s)
satisfying
TrA1(s1) = 1,
TrA2(s2) = s1 ⊗ eB1 ,
...
TrAn(sn) = sn−1 ⊗ eBn−1 ,
TrA′0(s) = sn ⊗ eBn ,
s1 ∈ RA1+ ,
sj ∈ RA1×B1×···×Bj−1×Aj+ , for all j ∈ {2, . . . , n},
s ∈ RA×B×A′0+ ,
where eBj is the vector of all ones in the corresponding space CBj .
We can use this polytope to capture Alice’s optimal cheating probabilities.
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Theorem 3.7 (Alice’s reduced problems [NST14]) For the BCCF-protocol defined by the parameters
α0, α1 ∈ ProbA and β0, β1 ∈ ProbB , we have
P ∗A,0 = max
12 ∑
a∈{0,1}
∑
y∈B
βa,y F(s
(a,y), αa) : (s1, . . . , sn, s) ∈ PA

and
P ∗A,1 = max
12 ∑
a∈{0,1}
∑
y∈B
βa¯,y F(s
(a,y), αa) : (s1, . . . , sn, s) ∈ PA
 ,
where s(a,y) is the projection of s onto the fixed indices a and y.
We refer to these as Alice’s reduced problems or Alice’s reduced SDPs when using the SDP char-
acterization of the fidelity function from Lemma 2.3. Context of the variables in Alice’s cheating
polytope and a proof of the above theorem are in Appendix D.
Remark We can see from Theorems 3.4 and 3.7 that switching β0 and β1 switches the values of
P ∗B,0 and P
∗
B,1 and it also switches the values of P
∗
A,0 and P
∗
A,1. We make use of this symmetry
several times in this paper.
As an example, and for future reference, we write the dual of Bob’s reduced cheating SDP for
forcing outcome 1 and the dual for Alice’s reduced cheating SDP for forcing outcome 0, respec-
tively, below
inf TrA1(w1) inf z1
s.t. w1 ⊗ eB1 ≥ TrA2(w2), s.t. z1 · eA1 ≥ TrB1(z2),
w2 ⊗ eB2 ≥ TrA3(w3), z2 ⊗ eA2 ≥ TrB2(z3),
...
...
wn ⊗ eBn ≥ 12
∑
a∈{0,1} αa ⊗ va, zn ⊗ eAn ≥ TrBn(zn+1),
Diag(va) 
√
βa¯
√
βa¯
>
, ∀a, Diag(z(y)n+1)  12βa,y
√
αa
√
αa
>, ∀a, y.
The structure of the reduced problems was an observation after numerically solving some
cheating SDP examples. We note that there are some similarities between the reduced prob-
lems above and the optimal solutions of the cheating SDPs for the weak coin-flipping protocols
in [Moc05]. The protocols Mochon considers in [Moc05] also give rise to “reduced problems” be-
ing the maximization of fidelity functions over a polytope. However, the analysis is much cleaner
in Mochon’s work since the objective function only involves a single fidelity function as opposed
to the linear combination of fidelity functions that arise for BCCF-protocols. This difference is due
to the fact that weak coin-flipping protocols often allow a stronger cheat detection step than those
for strong coin-flipping. Having a single fidelity function allowed Mochon to construct an optimal
solution using a dynamic programming approach. The structure of the objective functions in the
reduced problems above for BCCF-protocols has not so far revealed an obvious way to solve it
using dynamic programming, making this family of protocols harder to analyze.
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4 Point games for BCCF-protocols
In this section, we develop the point games corresponding to BCCF-protocols. Although this
section is self-contained, an interested reader may wish to see our Appendix A for a review of
point games or consult the work of [Moc07, ACG+14].
To summarize the idea behind point games, we take a feasible dual solution for Bob cheating
towards 1 and the same for Alice cheating towards 0 and consider the behaviour of their eigen-
values. When pairing certain eigenvalues from Bob with those from Alice, we obtain a collection
of finitely-many weighted points in the two-dimensional nonnegative orthant. The points have
a time-ordering to them and the transitions from one time step to the next are called “moves”
or simply “transitions” and the rules for these transitions can be described independently from
the protocol description. In this section, we examine the set of allowable moves for point games
derived from BCCF-protocols in the manner described above, and use them to find a protocol
independent definition.
We start by examining Kitaev’s lower bound involving the quantities P ∗B,1 and P
∗
A,0. Since we
are concerned with strong coin-flipping, the choice of Bob desiring outcome 1 and Alice desiring
outcome 0 for this part is somewhat arbitrary. However, this way we can compare them to point
games for other classes of weak coin-flipping protocols (see [Moc07]). We later show that we
lose no generality in choosing these two values, as we consider all four values simultaneously by
viewing the point games in pairs.
The dual for Bob’s cheating SDP for forcing outcome 1 is given by
P ∗B,1 = inf 〈W1,TrA1 |ψ〉〈ψ|〉
subject to Wj ⊗ IBj  Wj+1 ⊗ IAj+1 , for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} ,
Wn ⊗ IBn  Wn+1 ⊗ IA′ ⊗ IA′0 ,
Wn+1 ⊗ IB′ ⊗ IB′0  ΠA,1,
Wj ∈ SA0×A′0×B1×···×Bj−1×Aj+1×···×An×A′ ,
for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n},
Wn+1 ∈ SA0×B,
and the dual for Alice’s cheating SDP for forcing outcome 0 is given by
P ∗A,0 = inf 〈Z1, |φ〉〈φ|〉
subject to Zj ⊗ IAj  Zj+1 ⊗ IBj , for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n} ,
Zn+1 ⊗ IA′ ⊗ IA′0  ΠB,0 ⊗ IB′0 ⊗ IB′ ,
Zj ∈ SB0×B′0×A1×···×Aj−1×Bj×···×Bn×B′ ,
for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n, n+ 1}.
From SDP strong duality, we know that for every δ > 0, we can choose (W1, . . . ,Wn+1) feasible
for the dual of Bob’s cheating SDP and (Z1, . . . , Zn+1) feasible for the dual of Alice’s cheating SDP
such that (
P ∗B,1 + δ
) (
P ∗A,0 + δ
)
> 〈W1 ⊗ Z1,TrA1(|ψ〉〈ψ| ⊗ |φ〉〈φ|)〉.
For brevity, we define |ξj〉 and |ξ′j〉 equal to |ψ〉|φ〉 (with the spaces permuted accordingly) to be
the states of the protocol before Alice’s j’th message and before Bob’s j’th message, respectively,
when they follow the protocol honestly. From the dual constraints, we have
〈Wj ⊗ Zj ,TrAj |ξj〉〈ξj |〉 ≥ 〈Wj ⊗ Zj+1,TrBj |ξ′j〉〈ξ′j |〉 ≥ 〈Wj+1 ⊗ Zj+1,TrAj+1 |ξj+1〉〈ξj+1|〉
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for j ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}, and for the last few messages we have
〈Wn ⊗ Zn,TrAn |ξn〉〈ξn|〉 ≥ 〈Wn ⊗ Zn+1,TrBn |ξ′n〉〈ξ′n|〉
≥ 〈Wn+1 ⊗ Zn+1,TrA′0×A′ |ξn+1〉〈ξn+1|〉
≥ 〈Wn+1 ⊗ΠB,0,TrB′0×B′ |ξ′n+1〉〈ξ′n+1|〉
≥ 〈ΠA,1 ⊗ΠB,0, |ξn+2〉〈ξn+2|〉
and the last quantity equals 0 since Alice and Bob never output different outcomes when they are
both honest. Note that these are dual variables from the original cheating SDPs, not the reduced
version. The dual variables for the reduced version are scaled eigenvalues of the corresponding
dual variables above. However, we do reconstruct Kitaev’s proof above using the reduced SDPs
in Section 6.
As was done in [Moc07], we use the function Prob : SA+ × SB+ × SA×B+ → R, defined as
Prob(X,Y, σ) :=
∑
λ∈eig(X)
∑
µ∈eig(Y )
〈Π[λ]X ⊗Π[µ]Y , σ〉
[
λ, µ
]
,
where
[
λ, µ
]
: R2 → {0, 1} denotes the function that takes value 1 on input (λ, µ) and 0 otherwise.
Note this function has finite support which are the points in the point game. The quantity
〈Π[λ]X ⊗Π[µ]Y , σ〉
is said to be the associated probability of the point
[
λ, µ
]
.
To create a point game for a BCCF-protocol, we use the points that arise from feasible dual
solutions in the following way:
p0 := Prob(ΠA,1,ΠB,0, |ξn+2〉〈ξn+2|),
p′1 := Prob(Wn+1,ΠB,0,TrB′0×B′ |ξ′n+1〉〈ξ′n+1|),
p1 := Prob(Wn+1, Zn+1,TrA′0×A′ |ξ′n+1〉〈ξ′n+1|),
p′(n+2)−j := Prob(Wj , Zj+1,TrBj |ξ′j〉〈ξ′j |), for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n},
p(n+2)−j := Prob(Wj , Zj ,TrAj |ξj〉〈ξj |), for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n},
noting that the i’th point corresponds to the i’th last message in the protocol. This gives rise to the
point game moves (or transitions):
p0 → p′1 → p1 → · · · → p′j → pj → · · · → p′n+1 → pn+1,
which we give context to in the next subsection. The reason we define point games in reverse
time order is so that they always have the same starting state and it is shown later that the final
point captures the two objective function values of the corresponding dual feasible solutions. The
reverse time order ensures that we always start with the same p0 and aim to get a desirable last
point, instead of the other way around.
First, we calculate Prob(Wj , Zj ,TrAj |ξj〉〈ξj |), for j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Definition 4.1 For a string z ∈ {0, 1}∗, we define p(z) as the probability of string z being revealed during
an honest run of a fixed BCCF-protocol.
19
To capture these probabilities, we use the following (unnormalized) states defined from the
honest states in a BCCF-protocol.
Definition 4.2 For x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ A, y = (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ B, and j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, define
|ψx1,...,xj 〉 :=
1√
2
∑
xj+1∈Aj+1
· · ·
∑
xn∈An
∑
a∈{0,1}
√
αa,x |aa〉|xj+1, . . . , xn〉|xj+1, . . . , xn〉
and
|φy1,...,yj 〉 :=
1√
2
∑
yj+1∈Bj+1
· · ·
∑
yn∈Bn
∑
b∈{0,1}
√
βb,y |bb〉|yj+1, . . . , yn〉|yj+1, . . . , yn〉.
Note we have p(x1, . . . , xj) = 〈ψx1,...,xj |ψx1,...,xj 〉, for all (x1, . . . , xj) ∈ A1 × · · · × Aj , and
p(y1, . . . , yj) = 〈φy1,...,yj |φy1,...,yj 〉, for all (y1, . . . , yj) ∈ B1 × · · · ×Bj , for j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
From the proof of the reduced problems in Appendix D, we can assume an optimal choice of
Wj has eigenvalues
wj,x1,y1,...,yj−1,xj
p(x1,...,xj)
, where wj is the corresponding variable in the dual of Bob’s
reduced cheating SDP. Note that we do not need to worry about the case when p(x1, . . . , xj) = 0
(nor the division by 0) since this implies wj,x1,y1,...,yj−1,xj = 0. The same argument holds in the fol-
lowing cases whenever there is an issue of dividing by 0. The positive eigenvalues have respective
eigenspace projections
Π
[x1,y1,...,yj−1,xj ]
Wj
:= |x1, y1, . . . , yj−1, xj〉〈x1, y1, . . . , yj−1, xj | ⊗ |ψ˜x1,...,xj 〉〈ψ˜x1,...,xj |,
where |ψ˜x1,...,xj 〉 is |ψx1,...,xj 〉 normalized. The other eigenvalues do not contribute to the points
(this can be verified since these eigenvalues already contribute to probabilities adding to 1). Sim-
ilarly, an optimal choice of Zj has eigenvalues
zj,x1,y1,...,xj−1,yj−1
p(y1,...,yj−1) , where zj is the corresponding
variable in the dual of Alice’s reduced cheating SDP, with respective eigenspaces
Π
[x1,y1,...,xj−1,yj−1]
Zj
:= |x1, y1, . . . , xj−1, yj−1〉〈x1, y1, . . . , xj−1, yj−1| ⊗ |φ˜y1,...,yj−1〉〈φ˜y1,...,yj−1 |,
where |φ˜y1,...,yj−1〉 is |φy1,...,yj−1〉 normalized. From these eigenspaces, we can compute
〈Π[x
′
1,y
′
1,...,y
′
j−1,x
′
j ]
Wj
⊗Π[x1,y1,...,xj−1,yj−1]Zj ,TrAj |ξj〉〈ξj |〉
= δx1,x′1 · · · δxj−1,x′j−1δy1,y′1 · · · δyj−1,y′j−1 p(x1, y1, . . . , yj−1, xj).
Thus, we can write the point p(n+2)−j := Prob(Wj , Zj ,TrAj |ξj〉〈ξj |) as∑
x1∈A1
∑
y1∈B1
· · ·
∑
yj−1∈Bj−1
∑
xj∈Aj
p(x1, y1, . . . , yj−1, xj)
[
wj,x1,y1,...,yj−1,xj
p(x1, . . . , xj)
,
zj,x1,y1,...,xj−1,yj−1
p(y1, . . . , yj−1)
]
.
We can similarly write p′(n+2)−j := Prob(Wj , Zj+1,TrBj |ξ′j〉〈ξ′j |) as∑
x1∈A1
∑
y1∈B1
· · ·
∑
yj∈Bj
∑
xj∈Aj
p(x1, y1, . . . , xj , yj)
[
wj,x1,y1,...,yj−1,xj
p(x1, . . . , xj)
,
zj+1,x1,y1,...,xj ,yj
p(y1, . . . , yj)
]
.
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The first three points are different from above as they correspond to the last few messages in
the protocol (which are quite different from the first 2n messages). Nonetheless, the process is the
same and we can calculate them to be
p1 =
∑
a∈{0,1}
∑
x∈A
∑
y∈B
p(x, a) p(y)
[
va,y,
zn+1,x,y
p(y)
]
,
p′1 =
∑
b∈{0,1}
∑
y∈B
1
2
p(y, b¯)
[
vb,y, 0
]
+
∑
b,y
1
2
p(y, b)
[
vb,y, 1
]
,
p0 =
1
2
[
1, 0
]
+
1
2
[
0, 1
]
,
noting zn+1,x,y > 0 when p(y) > 0.
We call any point game constructed from dual feasible solutions in this manner a BCCF-point
game. In the next subsection, we describe rules for moving from one point to the next in any
BCCF-point game yielding a protocol independent definition.
4.1 Describing BCCF-point games using basic moves
Below are some basic point moves (or transitions) as Mochon describes them in [Moc07].
Definition 4.3 (Basic moves)
Point raising: q
[
w, z
]
→ q
[
w, z′
]
, for z ≤ z′,
Point merging: q1
[
w, z1
]
+ q2
[
w, z2
]
→ (q1 + q2)
[
w,
q1z1 + q2z2
q1 + q2
]
,
Point splitting: (q1 + q2)
w, q1 + q2(
q1
z1
)
+
(
q2
z2
)
→ q1 [w, z1]+ q2 [w, z2] , for z1, z2 6= 0.
An example of point splitting and point raising can be seen in Figure 4 and examples of point
mergings can be seen in Figures 5 and 6. Using a slight abuse of the definition of point splitting, if
we perform a point split then raise the points, we still refer to this as a point split (for reasons that
will be clear later). Also, we can merge or split on more than two points by repeating the process
two points at a time.
These are moves in the second coordinate (keeping the first coordinate fixed) called vertical
moves, and we similarly define horizontal moves acting on the first coordinate (keeping the second
coordinate fixed).
Mochon gives a rough interpretation of these moves in [Moc07]. We can think of point raising
as receiving a message, point merging as generating a message, and point splitting as checking
a message via quantum measurement. These interpretations apply to the family of weak coin-
flipping protocols in [Moc05], and we show they also apply to BCCF-protocols.
Below are some special cases of these moves which are useful when describing BCCF-point
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games.
Probability splitting: (q1 + q2)
[
z, w
]
→ q1
[
z, w
]
+ q2
[
z, w
]
,
Probability merging: q1
[
z, w
]
+ q2
[
z, w
]
→ (q1 + q2)
[
z, w
]
,
Aligning: q1
[
z1, w1
]
+ q2
[
z2, w2
]
→ q1
[
max{z1, z2}, w1
]
+ q2
[
max{z1, z2}, w2
]
.
Probability splitting is the special case of point splitting where the resulting points have the same
value and probability merging is the special case of point merging where the resulting points have
the same value. Aligning is just raising two points to the maximum of the two (usually so a merge
can be performed on the other coordinate).
We now show that each move in a BCCF-point game can be described using basic moves.
Consider the first transition:
1
2
[
1, 0
]
+
1
2
[
0, 1
]
→
∑
b∈{0,1}
∑
y∈B
1
2
p(y, b¯)
[
vb,y, 0
]
+
∑
b∈{0,1}
∑
y∈B
1
2
p(y, b)
[
vb,y, 1
]
,
which can be described in two steps. First,
1
2
[
0, 1
]
→
∑
b∈{0,1}
∑
y∈B
1
2
p(y, b)
[
vb,y, 1
]
,
is just probability splitting followed by point raising (in the first coordinate). The transition
1
2
[
1, 0
]
→
∑
b∈{0,1}
∑
y∈B
1
2
p(y, b¯)
[
vb,y, 0
]
,
is a point splitting. To see this, recall the dual constraint Diag(va) 
√
βa¯
√
βa¯
>, for a ∈ {0, 1}.
We have seen that this is equivalent to the condition
∑
y∈B
βa¯,y
va,y
≤ 1, when va > 0, which is the
condition for a point split. Technically, a point split would have this inequality satisfied with
equality, but we can always raise the points such that we get an inequality. As explained earlier,
we just call this a point split.
We can interpret the point raise as Alice accepting Bob’s last message b, and the point split as
Alice checking Bob’s state at the end of the protocol using her measurement. Note that these are
the last two actions of a BCCF-protocol.
We can do something similar for the second transition below
∑
b
∑
y
p(y, b¯)
2
[
vb,y, 0
]
+
∑
b
∑
y
p(y, b)
2
[
vb,y, 1
]
→
∑
a
∑
x
∑
y
p(x, a) p(y)
[
va,y,
zn+1,x,y
p(y)
]
.
To get this, for every b ∈ {0, 1}, y ∈ supp(βb), we point split[
vb,y, 1
]
→
∑
x∈A
αb,x
[
vb,y,
2zn+1,x,y
βb,y
]
.
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This is a valid point split since we have the dual constraint Diag
(
2z
(y)
n+1
βb,y
)
 √αb√αb>, for all
b ∈ {0, 1}, y ∈ supp(βb). Note that zn+1 does not depend on b so there are some consistency
requirements when performing these splits.
The points at this stage can be seen in Figure 4 for the special case of a four-round, i.e., n = 1,
BCCF-protocol with |A| = |B| = 2 (noting that p(y, b) = 12βb,y).
∑
a∈{0,1}
∑
y∈B
βa¯,y
4
[
va,y, 0
]
+
∑
a∈{0,1}
∑
y∈B
βa,y
4
[
va,y, 1
]
v
v
1
1
∑
a∈{0,1}
∑
y∈B
βa¯,y
4
[
va,y, 0
]
+
∑
a∈{0,1}
∑
y∈B
∑
x∈A
βa,yαa,x
4
[
va,y,
2z2,x,y
βa,y
]
v
v
s s s s
s s s s
1
1
Figure 4: After the point splits in a BCCF-point game.
For the other points, we perform the probability splitting:∑
b∈{0,1}
∑
y∈B
1
2
p(y, b¯)
[
vb,y, 0
]
→
∑
b∈{0,1}
∑
y∈B
∑
x∈A
1
2
p(y, b¯)αb,x
[
vb,y, 0
]
,
yielding the current state∑
b∈{0,1}
∑
y∈B
∑
x∈A
1
2
αb,x
(
p(y, b¯)
[
vb,y, 0
]
+ p(y, b)
[
vb,y,
2zn+1,x,y
βb,y
])
.
Merging the part in the brackets yields∑
b∈{0,1}
∑
y∈B
∑
x∈A
1
2
αb,xp(y)
[
vb,y,
zn+1,x,y
p(y)
]
=
∑
a∈{0,1}
∑
y∈B
∑
x∈A
p(x, a) p(y)
[
va,y,
zn+1,x,y
p(y)
]
,
where the quantity on the right just relabelled b as a. The transitions here were point splitting,
point merging, and point raising (from the dual constraint on zx,y, we can think of it as being a
maximum over a, corresponding to a raise). These correspond to Bob checking Alice, Bob gener-
ating b, and Bob receiving a, respectively.
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Fortunately, the rest of the transitions are straightforward. To explain the transition
∑
a∈{0,1}
∑
y∈B
∑
x∈A
p(x, a) p(y)
[
va,y,
zn+1,x,y
p(y)
]
→
∑
y∈B
∑
x∈A
p(x, y)
[
wn,x1,y1,...,yn−1,xn
p(x)
,
zn+1,x,y
p(y)
]
,
all we do is merge a, then align yn ∈ Bn in the first coordinate. To see why this is valid, we have the
dual constraint wn,x1,y1,...,yn−1,xn ≥
∑
a∈{0,1}
1
2αa,x va,y =
∑
a∈{0,1} p(x, a) va,y. This corresponds to
Alice generating a and receiving Bob’s message yn ∈ Bn. This is depicted in Figure 5.
∑
a∈{0,1}
∑
x∈A
∑
y∈B
p(x, a) p(y)
[
va,y,
z2,x,y
p(y)
]
v
vs s s s
s s s
s
s s s s
1
1
∑
x∈A
∑
y∈B
p(x, y)
[
w1,x
p(x)
,
z2,x,y
p(y)
]
v
v
s s s s
s s s s
1
1
Figure 5: After the first two merges in a BCCF-point game.
We show one more transition and the rest follow similarly. To show the transition
∑
y
∑
x
p(x, y)
[
wn,x1,y1,...,yn−1,xn
p(x)
,
zn+1,x,y
p(y)
]
→
∑
y1
· · ·
∑
yn−1
∑
x
p(x1, y1, . . . , yn−1, xn)
[
wn,x1,y1,...,yn−1,xn
p(x)
,
zn,x1,y1,...,xn−1,yn−1
p(y1, . . . , yn−1)
]
,
we merge on yn ∈ Bn then align xn ∈ An in the second coordinate. The dual constraint corre-
sponding to this is zn,x1,y1,...,xn−1,yn−1 ≥
∑
yn∈Bn zn+1,x,y. We can continue in this fashion until we
get to the last points ∑
x1∈A1
p(x1)
[
w1,x1
p(x1)
, z1
]
,
where z1 is Alice’s dual objective function value. If we merge on x1, we get Bob’s dual objective
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function value in the first coordinate  ∑
x1∈A1
w1,x1 , z1
 .
Therefore, if (w1, . . . , wn, v0, v1) is feasible for the dual of Bob’s reduced cheating SDP and if
(z1, . . . , zn, zn+1) is feasible for the dual of Alice’s reduced cheating SDP, then the final point of
the point game is comprised of the two dual objective function values, as seen in Figure 6.
∑
x∈A
p(x)
[
w1,x
p(x)
, z1
]
v
v
s s
s s
1
1
[∑
x∈A
w1,x, z1
]
v
v
s s
1
1
Figure 6: The last few moves of a BCCF-point game.
We summarize this entire process as a list of basic moves in Point Game 4.4.
Therefore, an optimal assignment of variables in the duals of the reduced cheating SDPs cor-
responds to a minimal final point in the point game. We now argue that these duals attain an
optimal solution. Since the optimal objective values are bounded above by 1, we can upper bound
the values on all of the variables in the duals accordingly (it can be shown that va,y ≤ 2|A|, for all
a ∈ {0, 1}, y ∈ B and the rest of the variables in the four duals are bounded above by 1). Also, they
are bounded below by 0 from the positive semidefiniteness constraints. Since we are optimizing a
continuous function over a compact set, we have that an optimal solution exists.
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Point Game 4.4 (BCCF-point game with final point
[
ζB, ζA
]
from basic moves)
1
2
[
1, 0
]
+
1
2
[
0, 1
]
→
∑
a∈{0,1}
1
4
[
1, 0
]
+
∑
a∈{0,1}
∑
y∈B
1
4
βa,y
[
0, 1
]
prob. splitting
→
∑
a∈{0,1}
∑
y∈B
1
4
βa¯,y
[
va,y, 0
]
+
∑
a∈{0,1}
∑
y∈B
1
4
βa,y
[
0, 1
]
point splitting
→
∑
a∈{0,1}
∑
y∈B
1
4
βa¯,y
[
va,y, 0
]
+
∑
a∈{0,1}
∑
y∈B
1
4
βa,y
[
va,y, 1
]
point raises
→
∑
a∈{0,1}
∑
y∈B
1
4
βa¯,y
[
va,y, 0
]
+
∑
a∈{0,1}
∑
y∈B
∑
x∈A
1
4
βa,yαa,x
[
va,y,
2zn+1,x,y
βa,y
]
point splitting
→
∑
a∈{0,1}
∑
y∈B
∑
x∈A
(
1
4
βa¯,yαa,x
[
va,y, 0
]
+
1
4
βa,yαa,x
[
va,y,
2zn+1,x,y
βa,y
])
prob. splitting
=
∑
a∈{0,1}
∑
y∈B
∑
x∈A
1
4
αa,x
(
βa¯,y
[
va,y, 0
]
+ βa,y
[
va,y,
2zn+1,x,y
βa,y
])
→
∑
a∈{0,1}
∑
y∈B
∑
x∈A
1
4
αa,x
 ∑
b∈{0,1}
βb,y
[va,y, zn+1,x,y
p(y)
]
merges
=
∑
a∈{0,1}
∑
y∈B
∑
x∈A
p(x, a) p(y)
[
va,y,
zn+1,x,y
p(y)
]
→
∑
y∈B
∑
x∈A
p(x, y)
[
wn,x1,y1,...,yn−1,xn
p(x)
,
zn+1,x,y
p(y)
]
merge a,
then align yn
→
∑
y1,...,yn−1
∑
x∈A
p(x, y1, . . . , yn−1)
[
wn,x1,y1,...,yn−1,xn
p(x)
,
zn,x1,y1,...,xn−1,yn−1
p(y1, . . . , yn−1)
]
merge yn,
then align xn
...
→
∑
x1∈A1
p(x1)
[
w1,x1
p(x1)
, ζA
]
merge y1,
then align x1
→ 1 [ζB, ζA] merge x1.
An example of an (optimal) BCCF-point game can be found in Appendix B corresponding to a
four-round BCCF-protocol with all four cheating probabilities equal to 3/4. Note this four-round
protocol is equivalent to a three-round protocol in [KN04] where we have set α0 = α1 to make the
first message “empty”.
4.2 Point game analysis
From the point game description, we see that the only freedom is in how we choose the point splits
since the rest of the points are determined from the merges and aligns. We expand on this idea
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when developing the succinct forms of the duals of the reduced SDPs in Subsection C.2. In each
of the succinct forms of these duals, the only freedom is in how we choose to satisfy the positive
semidefiniteness constraints. Once these variables are fixed, there is an obvious way to choose an
optimal assignment of the rest of the variables. Coincidentally, the last constraints in each dual
correspond to the point splits in the point game.
This brings us to the following protocol independent definition of BCCF-point games.
Definition 4.5 (BCCF-point game (protocol independent)) A BCCF-point game defined on the pa-
rameters α0, α1 ∈ ProbA and β0, β1 ∈ ProbB , with final point
[
ζB, ζA
]
, is any point game of the form
p0 :=
1
2
[
1, 0
]
+
1
2
[
0, 1
]
→ p1 → p2 → · · · → pm :=
[
ζB, ζA
]
,
where the transitions are exactly the basic moves as described in Point Game 4.4.
As mentioned above, one only has the freedom to choose how the points are split at the begin-
ning, the rest of the points are determined. Thus, every choice of point splitting yields a potentially
different point game (keeping α0, α1 ∈ ProbA and β0, β1 ∈ ProbB fixed). A BCCF-point game is
defined by α0, α1 ∈ ProbA and β0, β1 ∈ ProbB which are the same parameters that uniquely de-
fine a BCCF-protocol. However, there could be many point games corresponding to these same
parameters. The analogous concept for BCCF-protocols is that there could be many cheating
strategies for the same protocol. Of course, there is an optimal cheating strategy just as there is an
optimal BCCF-point game.
The above definition is protocol independent since we have defined starting points, an ending
point, and a description of how to move the points around. Indeed, the “rules” for the point
moves correspond exactly to dual feasible solutions with objective function values being the two
coordinates of the final point. This yields the following lemma which is the application of weak
and strong duality in the language of protocols and point games.
Lemma 4.6 Suppose
[
ζB,1, ζA,0
]
is the final point of a BCCF-point game defined on the parameters
α0, α1 ∈ ProbA and β0, β1 ∈ ProbB . Then
P ∗B,1 ≤ ζB,1 and P ∗A,0 ≤ ζA,0,
where P ∗B,1 and P
∗
A,0 are the optimal cheating probabilities for Bob forcing 1 and Alice forcing 0, respec-
tively, in the corresponding BCCF-protocol. Moreover, there exists a BCCF-point game with final point[
P ∗B,1, P
∗
A,0
]
.
In this paper, we are concerned with bounding the bias of strong coin-flipping protocols, and
therefore would like to bound all four cheating probabilities. Recall that Alice and Bob’s two
cheating probabilities are swapped when β0 and β1 are swapped. This motivates the following
definition.
Definition 4.7 (BCCF-point game pair) Suppose we have a BCCF-point game defined on the param-
eters α0, α1 ∈ ProbA and β0, β1 ∈ ProbB with final point
[
ζB,1, ζA,0
]
. Also, suppose we have another
BCCF-point game defined by the parameters α0, α1 ∈ ProbA and β′0:=β1, β′1:=β0 ∈ ProbB with fi-
nal point
[
ζB,0, ζA,1
]
. We call the two point games a BCCF-point game pair, defined by the parameters
α0, α1 ∈ ProbA and β0, β1 ∈ ProbB , with final point
[
ζB,0, ζB,1, ζA,0, ζA,1
]
.
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It is worth commenting that BCCF-point game pairs are defined over certain parameters even
though one of the point games in the pair is defined over swapped parameters.
Using Lemma 4.6, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 4.8 Suppose
[
ζB,0, ζB,1, ζA,0, ζA,1
]
is the final point of a BCCF-point game pair defined on the
parameters α0, α1 ∈ ProbA and β0, β1 ∈ ProbB . Then
P ∗B,0 ≤ ζB,0, P ∗B,1 ≤ ζB,1, P ∗A,0 ≤ ζA,0, and P ∗A,1 ≤ ζA,1,
where P ∗B,0, P
∗
B,1, P
∗
A,0, P
∗
A,1 are the optimal cheating probabilities for the corresponding BCCF-protocol.
Moreover, there exists a BCCF-point game pair with final point
[
P ∗B,0, P
∗
B,1, P
∗
A,0, P
∗
A,1
]
.
5 A related family of classical coin-flipping protocols
In this section, we describe a family of classical protocols which is the classical counterpart to
quantum BCCF-protocols. That is, we choose messages according to the underlying probability
distributions (instead of in a superposition) and we have a modified cheat detection step at the
end of the protocol.
We now describe the protocol.
Protocol 5.1 (Classical BCCF-protocol)
• Alice chooses a ∈ A0 uniformly at random and samples x ∈ A with probability αa,x.
• Bob chooses b ∈ B0 uniformly at random and samples y ∈ B with probability βa,y.
• For i from 1 to n: Alice sends xi ∈ Ai to Bob who replies with yi ∈ Bi.
• Alice fully reveals her bit by sending a ∈ A0 to Bob. If x 6∈ supp(αa), Bob aborts.
• Bob fully reveals his bit by sending b ∈ B0 to Alice. If y 6∈ supp(βb), Alice aborts.
• The outcome of the protocol is a⊕ b, if no one aborts.
The rest of this section illustrates the connections between this classical protocol and the quan-
tum version.
5.1 Formulating optimal classical cheating strategies as linear programs
We can similarly formulate optimal cheating strategies in the classical protocols as optimization
problems. In this case, we use linear programming as shown in the lemma below.
Lemma 5.2 For the classical BCCF-protocol defined by the parameters α0, α1 ∈ ProbA, β0, β1 ∈ ProbB ,
we can write the cheating probabilities for Alice and Bob, each forcing outcome 0, as
P ∗A,0 = max
12 ∑
a∈A′0
∑
y∈B
∑
x∈supp(αa)
βa,ysa,x,y : (s1, . . . , sn, s) ∈ PA
 ,
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and
P ∗B,0 = max
12 ∑
a∈A′0
∑
y∈supp(βa)
∑
x∈A
αa,x pn,x,y : (p1, . . . , pn) ∈ PB
 ,
respectively. We obtain P ∗A,1 and P
∗
B,1 by switching the roles of β0 and β1.
Proof We shall prove this for the case of cheating Bob as the case for cheating Alice is almost
identical. By examining Alice’s cheat detection, we see that if we switch the roles of β0 and β1
then we also switch P ∗B,0 and P
∗
B,1, so we only need to prove the P
∗
B,0 case.
After receiving the first message from Alice, Bob must choose a message to send. He can do
this probabilistically by choosing y1 ∈ B1 with probability p1,x1,y1 , yielding the first constraint in
Bob’s cheating polytope. Notice that his message can depend on Alice’s first message. We can
similarly argue that the probabilities with which he chooses the rest of his messages are captured
by the rest of the constraints in the cheating polytope with the exception of the last message. For
the last message, we assume that Bob replies with b = a, where a ∈ A0 was Alice’s last message,
if he desires outcome 0 and b = a¯ otherwise. Therefore, this decision is deterministic and is not
represented by the cheating polytope.
All that remains is to explain the objective function. Since Bob chooses his last message de-
terministically, the quantity 12αa,x pn,x,y is the probability that Alice reveals (x, a) and Bob reveals
(y, a). If he reveals y when βa,y = 0, he gets caught cheating, otherwise, his choice of b is accepted.
Therefore the objective function captures the total probability Alice accepts an outcome of 0. 
These are very similar to the quantum cheating probabilities except for the nonlinearity in the
objective functions. For example, in the quantum setting, cheating Alice’s objective function is
1
2
∑
a∈{0,1}
∑
y∈B
βa,y F(s
(a,y), αa) and for the classical setting, it is
1
2
∑
a∈{0,1}
∑
y∈B
βa,y 〈s(a,y), esupp(αa)〉,
where esupp(αa) is the 0, 1-vector taking value 1 only on the support of αa. We have a similar
observation for Bob. What is surprising is that we can capture the communication for both settings
with the same polytope.
To better understand this connection, we can write the objective function of Alice’s reduced
cheating SDP (for the quantum case) as
1
2
∑
a∈{0,1}
∑
y∈B
βa,y 〈
√
s(a,y)
√
s(a,y)
>
,
√
αa
√
αa
>〉.
Then the objective function for Alice’s cheating LP can be recovered if we replace
√
αa
√
αa
> with
Diag(esupp(αa)). Suppose we define a new projection
ΠB,0 :=
∑
a∈{0,1}
|a〉〈a| ⊗ |a〉〈a| ⊗Diag(esupp(αa))⊗ IB′ .
A quick check shows that we can repeat the entire proof of the reduced cheating problems (in
the quantum case) with this new projection if we also replace each occurrence of
√
αa
√
αa
> with
Diag(esupp(αa)). Similar statements can be made if we redefine the other projections as
ΠB,1 :=
∑
a∈{0,1}
|a¯〉〈a¯| ⊗ |a〉〈a| ⊗Diag(esupp(αa))⊗ IB′ ,
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ΠA,0 :=
∑
a∈{0,1}
|a〉〈a| ⊗ |a〉〈a| ⊗Diag(esupp(βa))⊗ IA′ ,
ΠA,1 :=
∑
a∈{0,1}
|a¯〉〈a¯| ⊗ |a〉〈a| ⊗Diag(esupp(βa))⊗ IA′ .
This provides two insights. First, it proves that if we weaken the quantum cheat detection, we
recover the optimal cheating probabilities for the corresponding classical protocol. Second, it gives
us a recipe for developing the point games for the classical version. Notice that the eigenvalues
of the dual variables are the same as in the quantum case, it is just that we have the stronger
constraints:
Diag(va)  Diag(esupp(βa¯)) compared to Diag(va) 
√
βa¯
√
βa¯
>
,
Diag(z
(y)
n+1)  12βa,yDiag(esupp(αa)) compared to Diag(z
(y)
n+1)  12βa,y
√
αa
√
αa
>.
Any solution of the constraint on the left satisfies the respective constraint on the right since
Diag(esupp(βa¯)) 
√
βa¯
√
βa¯
>
and
1
2
βa,yDiag(esupp(αa)) 
1
2
βa,y
√
αa
√
αa
>.
Since the dual feasible regions are smaller in the classical case, we get that the optimal objective
value cannot be less than the quantum version since they share the same objective function. This
makes sense since the classical protocol has a weaker cheat detection step and we could have larger
cheating probabilities. We can think of the classical case having more general strategies since the
cheat detection step in the quantum version rules out certain strategies from being optimal. In this
sense, the classical primal feasible regions are larger than those in the quantum version and the
classical dual feasible regions are smaller. This is similar to the relationship between the duality
of convex sets. We have that C1 ⊆ C2 implies C∗1 ⊇ C∗2 and the converse holds if C1 and C2 are
closed convex cones. This relationship is depicted in Figure 7.
Quantum
Dual Feasible Regions
Classical
Classical
Primal Feasible Regions
Quantum
Figure 7: Relationship between the primal and dual feasible regions of the quantum and classical
cheating strategy formulations.
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5.2 Point games for classical BCCF-protocols
In this subsection, we develop the classical analog to the quantum BCCF-point games. Using
these “classical point games”, we prove that at least one party can cheat with probability 1 in any
classical BCCF-protocol. A closer analysis shows that both cannot cheat with probability 1, which
holds true for quantum BCCF-protocols as well.
Since point games are defined in terms of dual SDPs, we use the above embedding of the
classical cheating LPs into SDPs to construct classical BCCF-point games. Due to the similarities,
very little about the quantum BCCF-point games needs to be changed to attain classical BCCF-
point games; we only need to change the definitions of Alice and Bob’s projections. Of course, the
dual solutions may be different due to the stronger constraints for the classical version. The only
differences are in the first few points (corresponding to the last few steps in Kitaev’s proof that
involve the projections). A quick calculation shows that these points are the same as well. The
reason for this is because, in Bob’s projections, we replace |ψa〉〈ψa| with Diag(esupp(αa)) ⊗ IA′ , but
they have the same inner product with the honest state of the protocol
〈|ψa〉〈ψa|, |ψa〉〈ψa|〉 = 〈|ψa〉〈ψa|,Diag(esupp(αa))⊗ IA′〉 = 1.
A similar argument holds for Alice’s projections as well.
Thus, the only difference between the classical point games are the values of the points, which
are derived from slightly different dual constraints. Let us examine the point splits. In the quan-
tum case, these are derived from the constraints
Diag(va) 
√
βa¯
√
βa¯
>
and Diag(z(y)n+1) 
1
2
βa,y
√
αa
√
αa
>, ∀a ∈ {0, 1}, y ∈ B.
In the classical case, the corresponding constraints are
Diag(v˜a)  Diag(esupp(βa¯)) and Diag(z˜(y)n+1) 
1
2
βa,yDiag(esupp(αa)), ∀a ∈ {0, 1}, y ∈ B.
It is easy to see that v˜a = esupp(βa¯) and
z˜n+1,x,y =

1
2β0,y if x ∈ supp(α0) \ supp(α1),
1
2β1,y if x ∈ supp(α1) \ supp(α0),
1
2 maxa∈{0,1}{βa,y} if x ∈ supp(α0) ∩ supp(α1),
0 otherwise,
are optimal assignments of these variables. Recall the two point splittings:
1
2
[
1, 0
]
→
∑
b∈{0,1}
∑
y∈B
1
4
βa¯,y
[
v˜a,y, 0
]
and
[
va,y, 1
]
→
∑
x∈A
αa,x
[
va,y,
2z˜n+1,x,y
βa,y
]
.
We see that these are just probability splittings using the optimal assignment above (with possibly
a point raise in the case of x ∈ supp(α0) ∩ supp(α1)). These probability splittings are in contrast
to the point splittings in the quantum case. The rest of the constraints are the same as in the
quantum case and correspond to point merging, probability merging, and aligning. Therefore, the
only difference between quantum BCCF-point games and the classical version is that non-trivial
point splittings are allowed in the quantum version. Therefore, we get the following definition.
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Definition 5.3 (Classical BCCF-point game (protocol independent)) A classical BCCF-point game
defined on the parameters α0, α1 ∈ ProbA and β0, β1 ∈ ProbB , with final point
[
ζB, ζA
]
, is a quantum
BCCF-point game defined by the same parameters and having the final point
[
ζB, ζA
]
but the point split-
tings are trivial (i.e., they are probability splittings).
Using this definition, we define classical BCCF-point game pairs analogously to the quantum ver-
sion.
To complete the picture, we now present the classical version of Theorem 4.8.
Theorem 5.4 Suppose
[
ζB,0, ζB,1, ζA,0, ζA,1
]
is the final point of a classical BCCF-point game pair defined
on the parameters α0, α1 ∈ ProbA and β0, β1 ∈ ProbB . Then
P ∗B,0 ≤ ζB,0, P ∗B,1 ≤ ζB,1, P ∗A,0 ≤ ζA,0, and P ∗A,1 ≤ ζA,1,
where P ∗B,0, P
∗
B,1, P
∗
A,0, P
∗
A,1 are the optimal cheating probabilities for the corresponding classical BCCF-
protocol. Moreover, there exists a classical BCCF-point game pair with final point
[
P ∗B,0, P
∗
B,1, P
∗
A,0, P
∗
A,1
]
.
Figure 8 depicts the intricate connections between quantum and classical BCCF-protocols and
their point games.
Quantum Protocol
Bob’s SDP
Alice’s SDP
Bob’s Dual SDP
Alice’s Dual SDP
Quantum Point Game
Cheating
Duality
Solutions
Classical Protocol
Bob’s LP
Alice’s LP
Bob’s Dual LP
Alice’s Dual LP
Classical Point Game
Measurement
Polytope Restricted F.R.
Point Splitting
(Quantum) SDP/SOCP
(Classical) LP
Setting
Primal Dual
Duality
Figure 8: Crystal structure of BCCF-protocols. F.R. denotes “feasible region”.
This crystal illustrates an analogy between physical theories and certain classes of convex op-
timization problems. More specifically, we see that the generalization of classical mechanics to
quantum mechanics is analogous to the generalization of linear optimization to semidefinite op-
timization. In the rest of this subsection, we elaborate on this idea and explain the benefits of
viewing cryptographic protocols with this perspective.
It was shown in [NST14] that the cheating SDPs can be written as SOCPs. The fact that the
cheating in our protocols can be modelled as second-order cone programs hints that our protocol is
using only a well-structured “part” of quantum mechanics. Indeed, apart from the initialization of
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the states at the beginning and the measurements at the end, our protocols only exchange quantum
systems. Thus, our protocols are conceptually not using every aspect of quantum mechanics at
every opportunity. Furthermore, the fact that the reduced problems are “almost linear programs”
hints that our protocols are “almost classical”, which is indeed the case. As we have discussed,
only the measurement at the end makes the BCCF-protocol “quantum”. Thus, there is some
philosophical connections between how “quantum” the protocol is and how “SDP” is the cheating
formulation. This is a purely philosophical statement, of course, but it could provide insights
towards protocol design. For example, in [Moc07], it was shown how to create quantum weak
coin-flipping protocols with arbitrarily small bias using SDPs. Since the structure of his protocols is
implicit in the analysis and is very complicated, perhaps a better understanding of the SDPs used
could shed light of the specific quantum mechanical behaviours to look for in designing such a
protocol.
On a more quantitative side, once could use optimization theory to provide a measure of the
complexity of a protocol. For example, in [NST14], we provide an SOCP representation for the
hypograph of the fidelity function (characterizing the cheating probabilities in the reduced prob-
lems). Recall that the hypograph of a concave function is a convex set. Also, the dimension
of the hypograph of F(, q) : Rn+ → R is equal to n (assuming q > 0). Since the hypograph is
O(n)-dimensional and convex, there exists a self-concordant barrier function for the set with com-
plexity parameter O(n), shown by Nesterov and Nemirovski [NN94]. The details of such func-
tions are not necessary for this paper, but we mention that such a function allows the derivation of
interior-point methods for the underlying convex optimization problem which useO(
√
n log(1/))
iterations, where  is an accuracy parameter. This suggests that we can use the complexity param-
eter of the self-concordant barrier function of the objective function characterizing cheating in
the protocol as a complexity measure for the protocol. Such a measure could also lend itself to
more general theories. For example, if one were to consider coin-flipping in a theory generalizing
quantum mechanics, then one could still measure the complexity of the protocol by considering
the complexity parameter of the objective function in a class of optimization problems possibly
generalizing semidefinite optimization. Considering this paper uses restrictions of semidefinite
optimization to characterize sub-quantum behaviour, it would not be surprising if generalizations
of semidefinite optimization would characterize super-quantum behaviour.
5.3 Security analysis of classical BCCF-protocols
We start by giving an alternative proof that these classical protocols have bias ε = 1/2 using the
language of point games.
Lemma 5.5 Suppose we have the following point game
p0 :=
1
2
[
0, 1
]
+
1
2
[
1, 0
]
→ p1 → · · · → pm−1 → pm :=
[
ζB, ζA
]
,
where each move is either point raising, point merging, probability merging, or probability splitting. Then
ζB ≥ 1 or ζA ≥ 1.
Proof Suppose for the purpose of contradiction that ζB, ζA < 1 and let i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} be the
smallest index such that pi has a point of the form
[
ζB,i, ζA,i
]
with ζB,i, ζA,i < 1. Since pi−1 has
no such points,
[
ζB,i, ζA,i
]
could not have been generated from a point raise, a probability merge,
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nor a probability split. Thus, pi−1 → pi must be a point merge and suppose without loss of
generality, it acted on the first coordinate. Then pi−1 has two points q1
[
ζ1, ζA,i
]
and q2
[
ζ2, ζA,i
]
with
q1 ζ1 + q2 ζ2
q1 + q2
= ζB,i < 1 implying ζ1 < 1 or ζ2 < 1, a contradiction to the minimality of the
choice of i. 
Using the above lemma and Theorem 5.4, we have that classical BCCF-protocols are insecure;
at least one party can cheat with probability 1.
There are two special cases of classical protocols we consider in greater detail. Recall the points
in the point game (before merging on a in the first coordinate)∑
a∈{0,1}
∑
y∈B
∑
x∈A
p(x, a) p(y)
[
va,y,
zn+1,x,y
p(y)
]
. (1)
The first case we consider is when α0, α1, β0, β1 > 0. Then we can set va,y = 1 for all a ∈ {0, 1},
y ∈ B and zn+1,x,y = 12 maxa∈{0,1} βa,y for all x ∈ A, y ∈ B. After the merges and aligns, we have
the final point being 1, ∑
y∈B
max
a∈{0,1}
1
2
βa,y
 = [1, 1
2
+
1
2
∆(β0, β1)
]
,
using Lemma 2.5. We can see that this is a BCCF-point game with an optimal assignment of
dual variables. Thus, Bob can cheat towards 1 perfectly and Alice can force 0 with probability
1
2 +
1
2∆(β0, β1) as seen on the left in Figure 9. These two quantities are invariant under switching
β0 and β1, thus P ∗B,0 = P
∗
B,1 = 1 and P
∗
A,0 = P
∗
A,1 =
1
2 +
1
2∆(β0, β1). The corresponding optimal
cheating strategies in the classical BCCF-protocol are obvious by noticing the cheat detection step
does nothing when the vectors have full support. Bob can send anything during the first n mes-
sages and then return b = a. Alice can send a corresponding to her best guess of b from her
information about y ∈ B, i.e., she can cheat with the probability she can infer b from y ∈ B. An
interesting observation is that this is a valid point game pair for both the classical and quantum
versions for any α0, α1 ∈ ProbA and β0, β1 ∈ ProbB since the dual feasible regions for the classical
formulations are contained in the dual feasible regions of the quantum formulations. Therefore,
we have that P ∗A,0, P
∗
A,1 ≤ 12 + 12∆(β0, β1) for every quantum BCCF-protocol as well. This bound
can be interpreted as follows. Suppose we change the order of the messages in the BCCF-protocol
in Alice’s favour, so that Bob’s first n messages are sent first, followed by all of Alice’s messages,
then finally Bob’s last message. Then Alice’s new cheating probability would be 12 +
1
2∆(β0, β1)
and is an obvious upper bound on the amount she can cheat in the original protocol (since she gets
information about b sooner than intended). This argument works for the classical and quantum
versions.
It may seem that classical protocols favour a cheating Bob, but this is not always the case.
Consider the case when β0 ⊥ β1 and α0, α1 > 0. Then zn+1,x,yp(y) = 1 for all y ∈ supp(β0) ∪ supp(β1),
thus the second coordinate equals 1 for all points in (1), and remains that way until the end of
the point game. This proves Alice can cheat with probability 1, which is obvious since Bob’s first
message fully reveals b and she can always pass the cheat detection step. The extent to which Bob
can cheat depends on the choice of α0 and α1 and can be calculated as∑
x1∈A1
max
a∈{0,1}
∑
x2∈A2
· · ·
∑
xn∈An
1
2
αa,x =
1
2
+
1
2
∆ (TrA2×···×An(α0),TrA2×···×An(α1)) ,
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using Lemma 2.5. This is a distance measure between the two marginal distributions over Alice’s
first message x1. This point game is depicted on the right in Figure 9. Bob can cheat with this
probability since he can choose b equal to his best guess for a¯ from his information about x1.
Once his first message is sent, he must keep his choice of b or he will be caught cheating with
certainty. These cheating probabilities do not depend on β0 or β1, so we have P ∗A,0 = P
∗
A,1 = 1 and
P ∗B,0 = P
∗
B,1 =
1
2
+
1
2
∆ (TrA2×···×An(α0),TrA2×···×An(α1)). Therefore, a classical BCCF-protocol
could favour either party.
v
v
1
1
[
1
2 +
1
2∆(TrA2×···×An(α0),TrA2×···×An(α1)), 1
]
v
v
1
1
[
1, 12 +
1
2∆(β0,β1)
]
Figure 9: Classical BCCF-point game examples. Left: A classical BCCF-point game favouring
cheating Bob. Right: A classical BCCF-point game favouring cheating Alice.
This raises the question: Can we find a BCCF-protocol such that both parties can perfectly
control the outcome? We now argue that no such classical, and hence no such quantum, BCCF-
protocol exists. Suppose for the purpose of contradiction that this is the case. Then we must have
1 = P ∗A,0 ≤
1
2
+
1
2
∆(β0, β1) ≤ 1
which implies β0 ⊥ β1. Then the only way for Bob to cheat with probability 1 is to have complete
information about a after Alice’s first message, implying the orthogonality condition
TrA2×···×An(α0) ⊥ TrA2×···×An(α1).
This can only be the case when α0 ⊥ α1 and in this case, as we have argued before, that Alice must
stick to her choice of a after her first message. Since she has no information about b before the start
of the protocol, she can only cheat with probability 1/2, a contradiction.
Therefore, there is no classical BCCF-protocol where both Alice and Bob can cheat perfectly,
and hence no quantum protocol. Along with the fact that classical protocols are insecure, this
proves the following theorem.
Theorem 5.6 In every quantum BCCF-protocol, at most one party can cheat with probability 1. In every
classical BCCF-protocol, exactly one party can cheat with probability 1.
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6 Using classical protocols to lower bound the quantum bias
In this section, we prove that no quantum BCCF-protocol can have bias ε = 1/
√
2 − 1/2. More
specifically, we prove that only protocols that share optimal cheating probabilities with their clas-
sical counterpart can saturate Kitaev’s lower bound on the product of the cheating probabilities.
This shows yet another connection between quantum and classical BCCF-protocols.
We start with rederiving Kitaev’s lower bound using the reduced SDPs. The duals of Bob’s
and Alice’s reduced SDPs, each for forcing outcome 0, are
inf TrA1(w1) inf z1
s.t. w1 ⊗ eB1 ≥ TrA2(w2), s.t. z1 · eA1 ≥ TrB1(z2),
w2 ⊗ eB2 ≥ TrA3(w3), z2 ⊗ eA2 ≥ TrB2(z3),
...
...
wn ⊗ eBn ≥ 12
∑
a∈{0,1} αa ⊗ va, zn ⊗ eAn ≥ TrBn(zn+1),
Diag(va) 
√
βa
√
βa
>
, ∀a, Diag(z(y)n+1)  12βa,y
√
αa
√
αa
>, ∀a, y,
respectively. Let (w1, . . . , wn, v0, v1) be optimal for Bob’s dual above and let (z1, . . . , zn+1) be opti-
mal for Alice’s dual above. We have
P ∗B,0P
∗
A,0 = TrA1(w1) z1 = 〈TrA1(w1), z1〉 = 〈w1, z1 · eA1〉 ≥ 〈w1,TrB1(z2)〉 = 〈w1 ⊗ eB1 , z2〉.
In a similar manner as was done in Section 4, we can alternate through most of the vector inequal-
ity dual constraints to show that
P ∗B,0P
∗
A,0 ≥ 〈wn ⊗ eBn , zn+1〉.
We bound the quantity 〈wn ⊗ eBn , zn+1〉 using the rest of the dual constraints, albeit in a slightly
different manner. We decompose zn+1 =
∑
y∈B z
(y)
n+1 ⊗ ey and use the rest of the dual constraints
to get
〈wn ⊗ eBn , zn+1〉 ≥
1
2
∑
a∈{0,1}
∑
y∈B
〈αa ⊗ va, z(y)n+1 ⊗ ey〉
=
1
2
∑
a∈{0,1}
∑
y∈B
〈√αa√αa>,Diag(z(y)n+1)〉〈Diag(va), eye>y 〉
≥ 1
2
∑
a∈{0,1}
∑
y∈B
〈√αa√αa>, 1
2
βa,y
√
αa
√
αa
>〉〈Diag(va), eye>y 〉
=
1
4
∑
a∈{0,1}
〈Diag(va),Diag(βa)〉
=
1
4
∑
a∈{0,1}
〈Diag(va),
√
βa
√
βa
>〉
≥ 1
4
∑
a∈{0,1}
〈
√
βa
√
βa
>
,
√
βa
√
βa
>〉
=
1
2
.
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Therefore, we get Kitaev’s lower boundP ∗A,0P
∗
B,0 ≥ 1/2 implying thatP ∗A,0 ≥ 1/
√
2 orP ∗B,0 ≥ 1/
√
2.
We get the inequality P ∗A,1P
∗
B,1 ≥ 1/2 by switching β0 with β1 in the proof above (and the dual
variables accordingly).
Using these two lower bounds, we show that it is impossible to have a quantum BCCF-
protocol with bias ε = 1/
√
2 − 1/2 by proving Kitaev’s bounds can only be saturated with proto-
cols where one party can cheat perfectly. More specifically, we show that if there exist four dual
solutions that saturate both of Kitaev’s bounds
P ∗A,0P
∗
B,0 ≥ 1/2 and P ∗A,1P ∗B,1 ≥ 1/2,
then all four of the dual solutions must also be feasible in the duals of the classical versions.
Theorem 6.1 Suppose a quantum BCCF-protocol satisfies P ∗A,0 P
∗
B,0 = 1/2 and P
∗
A,1 P
∗
B,1 = 1/2. Then
the cheating probabilities are the same as in the corresponding classical protocol defined on the same param-
eters.
Proof By looking at the proof of Kitaev’s bound above, we see that if it were saturated, then ev-
ery inequality must hold with equality. Therefore, we know Diag(va) 
√
βa
√
βa
> has no slack
on the subspace spanned by
√
βa
√
βa
>, i.e., 〈Diag(va) −
√
βa
√
βa
>
,
√
βa
√
βa
>〉 = 0, or equiva-
lently, 〈Diag(va),
√
βa
√
βa
>〉 = 1, for both a ∈ {0, 1}. Consider va = esupp(βa) which satisfies
Diag(va) 
√
βa
√
βa
> and the condition 〈Diag(va),
√
βa
√
βa
>〉 = 1. We show this choice is unique
(on supp(βa)). Consider the optimization problem
inf
{
〈Diag(va),
√
βa
√
βa
>〉 : Diag(va) 
√
βa
√
βa
>}
= inf
 ∑
y∈supp(βa)
va,yβa,y :
∑
y∈supp(βa)
βa,y
va,y
≤ 1, va,y > 0
 .
Obviously va = esupp(βa) is an optimal solution since 1 is a lower bound on the optimal objective
value. Suppose there are two different optimal solutions v′ and v′′. Notice that 12v
′ + 12v
′′ has the
same objective value, but satisfies the constraint
∑
y∈supp(βa)
βa,y
va,y
≤ 1 with strict inequality since
the function
∑
y∈supp(βa)
βa,y
va,y
is strictly convex. Thus, we can scale 12v
′+ 12v
′′ to get a better objective
function value, a contradiction. Therefore, if Kitaev’s bound is saturated, we must have va,y = 1
for all a ∈ {0, 1}, y ∈ supp(βa).
We argue the same about Alice’s dual variables z(y)n+1. If Kitaev’s inequalities are saturated,
we have 〈√αa√αa>,Diag(z(y)n+1) − 12βa,y
√
αa
√
αa
>〉 = 0, or just, 〈√αa√αa>,Diag(z(y)n+1)〉 = 12βa,y,
for all a, y such that va,y > 0, i.e., for all y ∈ supp(βa). Similar to the arguments above, we need
[z
(y)
n+1]x =
1
2βa,y for a ∈ {0, 1}, x ∈ supp(αa), and y ∈ supp(βa).
To summarize, if we have Kitaev’s bounds saturated, then the optimal dual solutions satisfy
Diag(va)  Diag(esupp(βa)) and Diag(z(y)n+1)  12βa,y Diag(esupp(αa)), for all a ∈ {0, 1}, y ∈ B, which
are exactly the constraints in the dual LPs for the classical version. Therefore, the protocol must
have the property that relaxing the cheat detections in ΠA,0 and ΠB,0 (obtaining the classical cheat
detections) preserves the two cheating probabilities. We can repeat the same argument with Al-
ice and Bob cheating towards 1 and get the two corresponding classical cheating probabilities.
Therefore, we have all four cheating probabilities are equal to those of the corresponding classical
protocol, as desired. 
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Since every classical protocol allows one party to cheat perfectly, we obtain Corollary 1.5, that
ε = 1/
√
2− 1/2 is impossible for any BCCF-protocol.
The proof of Theorem 6.1 gives necessary conditions on classical protocols that saturate Ki-
taev’s bound. Note from the condition on z(y)n+1, we have [zn+1]x,y =
1
2βa,y when βa,y, αa,x > 0.
In the case when α0, α1, β0, β1 > 0, then β0 must equal β1. This makes sense since Bob can easily
cheat with probability 1, but if β0 6= β1, then Alice could cheat with probability greater than 1/2.
In the case when α0 ⊥ α1, the condition above tells us nothing, but it is easy to see that Alice
fully reveals a in the first message, thus she can cheat with probability 1/2 and Bob can cheat with
probability 1.
7 Conclusions
We studied the security of quantum coin-flipping protocols based on bit-commitment utilizing
SDP formulations of cheating strategies. These SDPs allowed us to use concepts from convex
optimization to further our understanding of the security of such protocols. In particular, using a
reduction of the SDPs and duality theory, we were able to find the classical protocol counterpart
and develop a family of point games corresponding to each of the classical and quantum protocols.
Using the connections between classical and quantum BCCF-protocols, we were able to show
that a bias of ε = 1/
√
2− 1/2 is impossible for BCCF-protocols using a modified proof of Kitaev’s
lower bound.
An open problem is to find the optimal cheating strategies for a general n-round BCCF-
protocol. This can be accomplished by finding closed-form optimal solutions to the cheating SDPs
or the reduced cheating SDPs. Very few highly interactive protocols, such as BCCF-protocols,
have descriptions of optimal cheating strategies and therefore having such for this family of pro-
tocols would be very interesting.
A benefit of knowing the optimal strategies would be to help resolve the problem of finding
the smallest bias for BCCF-protocols. In [NST14], we analyzed BCCF-protocols from a com-
putational perspective. We computationally checked the bias of over 1016 four and six-round
BCCF-protocols and based on the findings we conjecture that having all four cheating probabili-
ties strictly less than 3/4 is impossible.
A related open problem is to find an explicit construction of optimal protocols for coin-flipping
and bit-commitment. We can accomplish both of these tasks by finding an explicit construction
of optimal weak coin-flipping protocols (see [CK09, CK11]), so this would be very rewarding.
Technically, such a construction is implicit in [Moc07], however it involves many reductions and
is quite complicated.
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A Coin-flipping and Kitaev’s protocol and point game formalisms
Kitaev developed point games from his SDP formulation of cheating strategies for coin-flipping
protocols. Here, we review the construction in [Moc07], see also [ACG+14].
We start with a general setting for a coin-flipping protocol. This setting has a space devoted
for messages and each message has the same dimension. This is done for convenience as it makes
the analysis in this section simpler.
A coin-flipping protocol can be described by the following parameters:
• The number of messages, denoted here as n. We can assume n is even,
• three Hilbert spaces: Alice’s private space CA, a message space CM , and Bob’s private space
CB ,
• a set of unitaries {UA,1, UA,3, . . . , UA,n−1} acting on CA×M . These correspond to Alice’s mes-
sages to Bob,
• a set of unitaries {UB,2, UB,4, . . . , UB,n} acting onCM×B . These correspond to Bob’s messages
to Alice,
• a projective measurement on CA for Alice (ΠA,0,ΠA,1,ΠA,abort) determining Alice’s protocol
outcome,
• a projective measurement on CB for Bob (ΠB,0,ΠB,1,ΠB,abort) determining Bob’s protocol
outcome.
The protocol proceeds as follows. Alice initializes the space CA to |ψA,0〉 and Bob initializes
CM×B to |ψM,0〉M |ψB,0〉B and sends CM to Alice. Then Alice applies her first unitary UA,1 and
sends CM to Bob. Then he applies his first unitary UB,2 and returns CM to Alice. They repeat
this until Bob applies his last unitary UB,n. Then they both measure their private spaces to get the
outcome of the protocol. This process is depicted in Figure 10 for the case of n = 4.
The protocol parameters must satisfy the requirements:
1. Alice and Bob do not abort when both are honest.
2. They output the same bit when they are honest, and that bit is randomly generated.
If we let |ψn〉 ∈ CA×M×B be the state at the end of the protocol when Alice and Bob are honest,
both requirements are satisfied when
〈ΠA,0 ⊗ IM ⊗ΠB,0, |ψn〉〈ψn|〉 = 〈ΠA,1 ⊗ IM ⊗ΠB,1, |ψn〉〈ψn|〉 = 1
2
. (2)
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CA CM CB
|ψA,0〉 |ψM,0〉 |ψB,0〉
UA,1
UA,3
UB,2
UB,4
{ΠA,0,ΠA,1,ΠA,abort} {ΠB,0,ΠB,1,ΠB,abort}
Figure 10: Four-round coin-flipping protocol.
A.1 Cheating SDPs
We can calculate the extent cheating Bob can force honest Alice to output a fixed desired outcome,
say c ∈ {0, 1}, by solving the following SDP:
P ∗B,c = max 〈ΠA,c, ρA,n〉
subject to ρA,0 = |ψA,0〉〈ψA,0|,
ρA,i = ρA,i−1, for all i even,
TrM (ρ˜A,i) = ρA,i, for all i even,
ρA,i = TrM
(
UA,iρ˜A,i−1U∗A,i
)
, for all i odd,
ρA,i ∈ SA+, for all i,
ρ˜A,i ∈ SA×M+ , for all i even.
The variables describe the parts of the quantum state under Alice’s control during different times
in the protocol as depicted in Figure 11. The constraints model how much cheating Bob can change
the current state of the protocol in each message and the objective function is the probability Alice
accepts outcome c ∈ {0, 1} by measuring the state she has at the end of the protocol.
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We get a very similar SDP for cheating Alice by switching the projections and interchanging
the “odd” constraints with the “even” ones:
P ∗A,c = max 〈ΠB,c, ρB,n〉
subject to ρB,0 = |ψB,0〉〈ψB,0|,
ρB,i = ρB,i−1, for all i odd,
TrM (ρ˜B,i) = ρB,i, for all i odd,
ρB,i = TrM
(
UB,iρ˜B,i−1U∗B,i
)
, for all i even,
ρB,i ∈ SB+, for all i,
ρ˜B,i ∈ SM×B+ , for all i odd.
The variables for a cheating Alice are also depicted in Figure 11. These SDPs are referred to as
Alice and Bob’s cheating SDPs.
CA CM CB
ρA,0
ρ˜A,0
ρA,1
ρA,2
ρ˜A,2
ρA,3
ρA,4
ρB,0
ρB,1
ρ˜B,1
ρB,2
ρB,3
ρ˜B,3
ρB,4
|ψA,0〉 |ψM,0〉 |ψB,0〉
UA,1
UA,3
UB,2
UB,4
{ΠA,0,ΠA,1,ΠA,abort} {ΠB,0,ΠB,1,ΠB,abort}
Figure 11: Four-round coin-flipping protocol with SDP variables depicted.
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The duals of the above SDPs are as follows:
inf 〈ZA,0, |ψA,0〉〈ψA,0|〉
subject to ZA,i−1 ⊗ IM  U∗A,i(ZA,i ⊗ IM )UA,i, for all i odd,
ZA,i−1 = ZA,i, for all i even,
ZA,n = ΠA,c,
and
inf 〈ZB,0, |ψB,0〉〈ψB,0|〉
subject to ZB,i−1 ⊗ IM  U∗B,i(ZB,i ⊗ IM )UB,i, for all i even,
ZB,i−1 = ZB,i, for all i odd,
ZB,n = ΠB,c.
We can derive a lower bound on the bias of any strong coin-flipping protocol by examining
feasible dual solutions. Since the dual SDPs have strictly feasible solutions and the objective func-
tion is bounded on the feasible region, there is zero duality gap. Therefore, for Alice and Bob
forcing outcome 0, and for any δ > 0, we can find feasible dual solutions (ZB,0, . . . , ZB,n) and
(ZA,0, . . . , ZA,n), such that
P ∗A,0 + δ > 〈ZB,0, |ψB,0〉〈ψB,0|〉 and P ∗B,0 + δ > 〈ZA,0, |ψA,0〉〈ψA,0|〉.
Therefore, we have(
P ∗B,0 + δ
) (
P ∗A,0 + δ
)
> 〈ZB,0, |ψB,0〉〈ψB,0|〉〈ZA,0, |ψA,0〉〈ψA,0|〉
= 〈ZA,0 ⊗ IM ⊗ ZB,0, |ψA,0〉〈ψA,0| ⊗ |ψM,0〉〈ψM,0| ⊗ |ψB,0〉〈ψB,0|〉
= 〈ZA,0 ⊗ IM ⊗ ZB,0, |ψ0〉〈ψ0|〉,
where we define |ψ0〉 to be the state at the beginning of the protocol when Alice and Bob are
honest. Let |ψi〉 be the state after Bob applies UB,i in an honest run of the protocol for i even. We
have from the dual constraints, for i even,
〈ZA,i ⊗ IM ⊗ ZB,i, |ψi〉〈ψi|〉
≥ 〈U∗A,i+1(ZA,i+1 ⊗ IM )UA,i+1 ⊗ ZB,i, |ψi〉〈ψi|〉
= 〈ZA,i+1 ⊗ IM ⊗ ZB,i, (UA,i+1 ⊗ IB)|ψi〉〈ψi|(U∗A,i+1 ⊗ IB)〉
= 〈ZA,i+2 ⊗ IM ⊗ ZB,i+1, (UA,i+1 ⊗ IB)|ψi〉〈ψi|(U∗A,i+1 ⊗ IB)〉
≥ 〈ZA,i+2 ⊗ U∗B,i+2(IM ⊗ ZB,i+2)UB,i+2, (UA,i+1 ⊗ IB)|ψi〉〈ψi|(U∗A,i+1 ⊗ IB)〉
= 〈ZA,i+2 ⊗ IM ⊗ ZB,i+2, |ψi+2〉〈ψi+2|〉.
We can compute
〈ZA,n ⊗ IM ⊗ ZB,n, |ψn〉〈ψn|〉 = 〈ΠA,0 ⊗ IM ⊗ΠB,0, |ψn〉〈ψn|〉 = 1/2,
from condition (2). Taking the limit as δ → 0, we get
P ∗B,0P
∗
A,0 ≥
1
2
=⇒ max{P ∗B,0, P ∗A,0} ≥ 1√
2
=⇒ ε ≥ 1√
2
− 1
2
.
This lower bound was later reproven by Gutoski and Watrous [GW07] using a different represen-
tation of quantum strategies.
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Notice that we can reproduce the proof above using dual feasible solutions for Bob cheating
towards 1 and Alice cheating towards 0. In this case, we get the final condition
〈ZA,n ⊗ IM ⊗ ZB,n, |ψn〉〈ψn|〉 = 〈ΠA,0 ⊗ IM ⊗ΠB,1, |ψn〉〈ψn|〉 = 0.
This gives a trivial bound on the product of the cheating probabilities. However, Kitaev used this
to create point games which we discuss below. We refer the reader to [Moc07] for the full details
of the construction of general point games as all the details are not needed for this paper.
A.2 Point games
Let eig(Z) denote the set of eigenvalues for an operator Z and let Π[λ]Z denote the projection onto
the eigenspace of Z corresponding to eigenvalue λ ∈ eig(Z). For a quantum state σ ∈ Sn+, and
X,Y ∈ Sn+, denote by Prob(X,Y, σ) : R2 → R+ the function
Prob(X,Y, σ) :=
∑
λ∈eig(X)
∑
µ∈eig(Y )
〈Π[λ]X ⊗Π[µ]Y , σ〉
[
λ, µ
]
,
where we use the notation
[
λ, µ
]
: R2 → R to denote the function that takes value 1 on input (λ, µ)
and 0 otherwise. Note this function has finite support. Using this definition, we can create a point
game from feasible dual variables as follows
pn−i := Prob(ZB,i, ZA,i,TrM |ψi〉〈ψi|),
recalling that |ψi〉 ∈ CA×M×B is the state after Bob applies UB,i in an honest run of the protocol.
Consider the dual SDPs for weak coin-flipping, i.e., Bob trying to force outcome 1 and Alice trying
to force outcome 0. We can calculate p0 = 12
[
0, 1
]
+ 12
[
1, 0
]
, which acts as the starting point of the
point game. Notice for any δ > 0, there exists a large constant Λ such that
ZA,0(δ) := (〈ψA,0|ZA,0|ψA,0〉+ δ) |ψA,0〉〈ψA,0|+ Λ (I− |ψA,0〉〈ψA,0|)  ZA,0, (3)
which can be proved using the Schur complement after writing ZA,0 in a basis containing |ψA,0〉.
Notice (ZA,0(δ), ZA,1, . . . , ZA,n) is feasible if (ZA,0, ZA,1, . . . , ZA,n) is feasible and has the same ob-
jective function value as δ → 0. If we replace ZA,0 with ZA,0(δ), and replace ZB,0 with the properly
modified definition of ZB,0(δ), we get that the final point is
pn = 1
[
〈ψA,0|ZA,0|ψA,0〉+ δ, 〈ψB,0|ZB,0|ψB,0〉+ δ
]
.
By strong duality, we see that we can choose the dual feasible solutions and δ such that this final
point gets arbitrarily close to
[
P ∗B,1, P
∗
A,0
]
.
A point game p0 → p1 → · · · → pn with final point
[
ζB, ζA
]
can be defined independent of
protocols. Define [x] : R → R to be the function that takes value 1 on input x and equals 0,
otherwise. Then p0 → p1 → · · · → pn is a point game with final point
[
ζB, ζA
]
, if each pi is a
function with finite support, p0 = 12
[
0, 1
]
+ 12
[
1, 0
]
, pn = 1
[
ζB, ζA
]
, and the moves (or transitions)
pi → pi+1 have one of the following forms (possibly acting on only a subset of the points)
•
∑
a∈A
pi,a
[
xa, y
]
→
∑
b∈B
pi+1,b
[
zb, y
]
(called a horizontal move),
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•
∑
a∈A
pi,a
[
y, xa
]
→
∑
b∈B
pi+1,b
[
y, zb
]
(called a vertical move),
where
∑
a∈A
pi,a =
∑
b∈B
pi+1,b (called conservation of probability) and
∑
b∈B
pi+1,b[zb]−
∑
a∈A
pi,a[xa] ∈ OMF∗,
where OMF is the cone of operator monotone functions. The purpose of the last condition above
is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is used to prove that if there is a point game with final
point
[
ζB, ζA
]
, then for any δ > 0, there exists a coin-flipping protocol with P ∗B,1 ≤ ζB + δ and
P ∗A,0 ≤ ζA + δ (see [Moc07] for details). Mochon proved that there exists a point game with final
point
[
1/2 + δ, 1/2 + δ
]
, for any δ > 0, proving the existence of weak coin-flipping protocols with
arbitrarily small bias.
B A BCCF-point game example with final point [3/4, 3/4]
In this section, we give an example BCCF-protocol and give an (optimal) BCCF-point game with
final point
[
3/4, 3/4
]
. It can be shown that all four cheating probabilities are equal to 3/4, which
is the best BCCF-protocol we know how to construct to date and we conjecture is optimal based
on numerical evidence [NST14].
The BCCF-protocol we consider is a four-round protocol defined by the parameters
α0 := α1 := [1, 0]
> and β0 := [1/2, 1/2, 0]>, β1 := [1/2, 0, 1/2]>.
Solving for the optimal dual solution, we get
w1 = [3/4, 0]
>, v0 = [3/4, 0, 3/2]>, v1 = [3/4, 3/2, 0]>
for cheating Bob and, for cheating Alice,
z1 = 3/4, z
(0)
2 = [1/4, 0]
>, z(1)2 = [1/4, 0]
>, z(2)2 = [1/4, 0]
>.
The point game is as follows which can be visualized using Figures 4, 5, and 6.
Point Game B.1 (BCCF-point game example with final point
[
3/4, 3/4
]
)
1
2
[
0, 1
]
+
1
2
[
1, 0
]
→ 1
2
[
0, 1
]
+
1
4
[
3
4
, 0
]
+
1
4
[
3
2
, 0
]
Horizontal Split
→ 1
4
[
0, 1
]
+
1
4
[
3
4
, 1
]
+
1
4
[
3
4
, 0
]
+
1
4
[
3
2
, 0
]
Horizontal Raise
→ 1
4
[
0, 1
]
+
1
2
[
3
4
,
1
2
]
+
1
4
[
3
2
, 0
]
Vertical Merge
→ 1
4
[
0, 1
]
+
1
2
[
3
4
,
1
2
]
+
1
4
[
3
2
, 1
]
Vertical Raise
→ 1
2
[
3
4
, 1
]
+
1
2
[
3
4
,
1
2
]
Horizontal Merge
→
[
3
4
,
3
4
]
Vertical Merge
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A few things to note is that the four probability vectors defining the protocol do not have full
support. Therefore, there are some points with “0 probability”. For example, from the figures we
would be tempted to think there should be a point
[
3/2, 1
]
, but this point has 0 probability and is
thus not effectively there. For the same reasons the dual vectors do not have full support and thus
we are able to have a point remain at
[
0, 1
]
after the first horizontal point raises.
C Extra properties of BCCF-protocols
In this section, we give some extra properties of BCCF-protocols and of their cheating polytopes.
C.1 Extreme points of the cheating polytopes
This subsection examines the extreme points of Alice and Bob’s cheating polytopes which appear
in both the quantum and classical cheating strategy formulations. We show that deterministic
strategies correspond to the extreme points of the cheating polytopes. One can argue this directly
from the properties of the protocol. However, we give a strictly algebraic proof based on the
properties of the cheating polytopes.
Definition C.1 An extreme point of a convex set C is a point x ∈ C such that if x = λy + (1 − λ)z, for
λ ∈ (0, 1), y 6= z, then y 6∈ C or z 6∈ C.
We start with a well-known fact.
Fact C.2 Suppose x˜ ∈ {x ≥ 0 : Γx = b}. Then x˜ is an extreme point of {x ≥ 0 : Γx = b} if and only if
there does not exist nonzero u ∈ Null(Γ) with supp(u) ⊆ supp(x˜).
We can use this fact to prove the following lemma.
Lemma C.3 Suppose (p1, . . . , pn) ∈ PB and (s1, . . . , sn, s) ∈ PA. Then the vectors are extreme points of
their respective polytopes if and only if they are Boolean, i.e., all of their entries are 0 or 1.
Proof We prove it for Bob’s cheating polytope as the proof for Alice’s is nearly identical. Suppose
(p1, . . . , pn) ∈ PB is Boolean, we show it is an extreme point. Let Bob’s polytope PB be repre-
sented by the linear system Γ(p1, . . . , pn) = b, (p1, . . . , pn) ≥ 0. Let (u1, . . . , un) ∈ Null(Γ) satisfy
supp(u1, . . . , un) ⊆ supp(p1, . . . , pn). We argue that (u1, . . . , un) must be the zero vector. The con-
straint on p1 is
∑
y1
p1,x1,y1 = 1 for all x1 ∈ A1. Therefore, since p1 is Boolean, there is exactly one
value of y1 for every x1 such that p1,x1,y1 = 1. These are the only entries of u1 that can be nonzero,
but since (u1, . . . , un) ∈ Null(Γ) we must have that entry equal to 0. We can repeat this argument
to get ui = 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Therefore, (p1, . . . , pn) is an extreme point.
Conversely, suppose (p1, . . . , pn) ∈ PB is not Boolean. Let i be the smallest index where pi
is not Boolean. If i > 1, define uj := 0 for j ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1}. Let (xˆ1, yˆ1, . . . , xˆi, yˆi) be an in-
dex such that pi,xˆ1,yˆ1,...,xˆi,yˆi ∈ (0, 1). From the constraints, we must have another yˆ′i such that
pi,xˆ1,yˆ1,...,xˆi,yˆ′i ∈ (0, 1) as well (since they must add to 1). Now define ui,xˆ1,yˆ1,...,xˆi,yˆi := t, for some
t 6= 0, and ui,xˆ1,yˆ1,...,xˆi,yˆ′i := −t, and the rest of the entries of ui to be 0. We define ui+1 to be equal
to pi+1, but we scale each entry such that
TrBi+1(ui+1) = ui ⊗ eAi+1 .
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We inductively define uj in this way for all j ∈ {i+ 2, . . . , n}. Thus, since we scaled (p1, . . . , pn) to
get (u1, . . . , un), we have that supp(u1, . . . , un) ⊆ supp(p1, . . . , pn) and also (u1, . . . , un) ∈ Null(Γ)
implying (p1, . . . , pn) cannot be an extreme point. 
We see that extreme points of the cheating polytopes correspond to the strategies where Alice
and Bob choose their next bit deterministically depending on the bits revealed.
Corollary C.4 In a classical BCCF-protocol, Alice and Bob each have an optimal cheating strategy which
is deterministic.
Proof In a linear program whose feasible region does not contain lines, if there exists an optimal
solution then there exists an optimal solution which is an extreme point of the feasible region.
The result follows since the feasible region is nonempty and compact implying the existence of an
optimal solution. 
C.2 A succinct way to write the duals of the reduced formulations
In this subsection, we present a simple form for the duals of the reduced cheating SDPs. We show
that we only need to consider the variables in the positive semidefiniteness constraints, since the
linear inequalities reveal how to optimally assign the rest of the variables. Sometimes it is easier
to work with the succinct form developed in this section because handling many dual variables
can overcomplicate simple ideas. For example, in Appendix C.3, we show that the smallest bias
attainable by BCCF-protocols is not affected if we restrict BCCF-protocols to have 2-dimensional
(qubit) messages.
Recall the dual of Bob’s reduced cheating SDP for forcing outcome 0, below
inf TrA1(w1)
subject to w1 ⊗ eB1 ≥ TrA2(w2),
w2 ⊗ eB2 ≥ TrA3(w3),
...
wn ⊗ eBn ≥ 12
∑
a∈{0,1} αa ⊗ va,
Diag(va) 
√
βa
√
βa
>
, for all a ∈ {0, 1}.
Let us examine the first constraint w1 ⊗ eB1 ≥ TrA2(w2). This is equivalent to
w1,x1 ≥
∑
x2∈A2
w2,x1,y1,x2
for all x1 ∈ A1, y1 ∈ B1. Once we fix a value for w2, an optimal choice of w1 is
w1,x1 = max
y1∈B1
∑
x2∈A2
w2,x1,y1,x2 .
Using this idea, we can rewrite Bob’s dual as
inf
Diag(va)
√
βa
√
βa
>
 ∑
x1∈A1
max
y1∈B1
∑
x2∈A2
max
y2∈B2
· · ·
∑
xn∈An
max
yn∈Bn
∑
a∈{0,1}
1
2
αa,xva,y

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and Alice’s as
inf
Diag(z
(y)
n+1) 12βa,y
√
αa
√
αa
>
maxx1∈A1 ∑
y1∈B1
· · · max
xn∈An
∑
yn∈Bn
zn+1,x,y
 ,
each for forcing outcome 0. We can switch β0 with β1 to get the succinct forms for Alice and Bob
forcing outcome 1.
This shows that the objective values are determined once some of the dual variables are fixed.
We see this idea when designing the point games corresponding to BCCF-protocols.
C.3 An SDP proof for why qubit messages are sufficient
In this subsection, we show how the succinct representation of the duals helps us prove a novel
result, that we can bound the dimension of the messages in BCCF-protocols without increasing
the smallest attainable bias.
We use the reduced cheating SDPs to prove that we can assume Ai = Bi = {0, 1}, that is, each
message is a single qubit. More specifically, we show that for any BCCF-protocol, there exists
another BCCF-protocol with qubit messages where the bias is no greater. We prove it for Alice’s
messages as the proof for Bob’s messages is nearly identical.
Suppose we have a protocol defined by
A = A1 × · · · ×An, B = B1 × · · · ×Bn, α0, α1 ∈ ProbA, β0, β1 ∈ ProbB.
Suppose Alice’s i’th message has large dimension, that is, |Ai| > 2. We define a new protocol
by replacing Ai with A′i × A′′i , where |Ai| ≤ |A′i × A′′i |. Notice that α0 and α1 can be viewed as
probability distributions over A1 × · · · × Ai−1 × A′i × A′′i × Ai+1 × · · · × An in the obvious way.
We also add a “dummy” message from Bob by adding Bd in between Bi and Bi+1. This dummy
message needs to be independent of the protocol, so we can suppose Bob sends |0〉. This effectively
replaces βb with β′b := βb ⊗ [1, 0]>d , for each b ∈ {0, 1}. If Alice and Bob cannot cheat more in this
new protocol, then we can repeat these arguments to show that all of Alice’s messages are qubit
messages by inductively breaking up the CAi spaces.
Bob’s cheating probabilities do not increase
We now show that Bob cannot use the extra message to cheat more in the new protocol. We
show this by constructing a dual feasible solution.
In the original protocol, cheating Bob can force outcome 0 with maximum probability given by
the optimal objective value of the following problem
inf
Diag(va)
√
βa
√
βa
>
 ∑
x1∈A1
max
y1∈B1
∑
x2∈A2
max
y2∈B2
· · ·
∑
xn∈An
max
yn∈Bn
∑
a∈{0,1}
1
2
αa,xva,y
 .
In the new protocol, cheating Bob can force outcome 0 with maximum probability given by the
optimal objective value of the following problem
inf
Diag(v˜a)
√
β′a
√
β′a
>
∑
x1
max
y1
∑
x2
max
y2
· · ·
∑
x′i∈A′i
max
yd∈Bd
∑
x′′i ∈A′′i
· · ·
∑
xn
max
yn
∑
a∈{0,1}
1
2
αa,xv˜a,y
 .
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For any (v0, v1) feasible in the first problem, we can define a solution feasible in the second prob-
lem (v˜0, v˜1) :=
(
v0 ⊗ [1, 0]>d , v1 ⊗ [1, 0]>d
)
with the same objective function value. Notice the same
argument holds if we switch β0 with β1 and β′0 with β′1, i.e., if Bob wants outcome 1. Since these
are minimization problems, Bob can cheat no more in the new protocol.
Alice’s cheating probabilities do not increase
We now show that Alice cannot use her extra message to cheat more in the new protocol. To
show this, we repeat the same argument as in the case for cheating Bob.
In the original protocol, cheating Alice can force outcome 0 with maximum probability given
by the optimal objective value of the following problem
inf
Diag(z
(y)
n+1) 12βa,y
√
αa
√
αa
>
maxx1∈A1 ∑
y1∈B1
· · · max
xn∈An
∑
yn∈Bn
zn+1,x,y
 .
In the new protocol, cheating Alice can force outcome 0 with maximum probability given by
the optimal objective value of the following problem
inf
Diag(z˜
(y)
n+1) 12β′a,y
√
αa
√
αa
>
maxx1∈A1 ∑
y1∈B1
· · · max
x′i∈A′i
∑
yd∈Bd
max
x′′i ∈A′′i
· · · max
xn∈An
∑
yn∈Bn
z˜n+1,x,y
 .
For any zn+1 feasible in the first problem, we can define a solution feasible in the second problem
z˜n+1 := zn+1 ⊗ [1, 0]>d with the same objective function value. Notice the same argument holds if
we switch β0 with β1 and β′0 with β′1, i.e., if Alice wants outcome 1. Since these are minimization
problems, Alice can cheat no more in the new protocol.
D Proof of correctness for the reduced problems
We start with a technical lemma whose proof is obvious using Equation (3).
Lemma D.1 (Subspace lemma) For a vector |ψ〉 ∈ Cn, a set S ⊆ Sn, and a continuous, monotonically
nondecreasing function F , we have
inf
X,Y ∈Sn
{F (〈ψ|X|ψ〉) : X  Y, Y ∈ S} = inf
X,Y ∈Sn
{F (〈ψ|X|ψ〉) : 〈ψ|X|ψ〉 ≥ 〈ψ|Y |ψ〉, Y ∈ S}.
This lemma can be generalized. We can use this lemma whenever the constraint on X is sat-
isfied by replacing it with X(δ) (from Equation (3)) for δ > 0. The most complicated constraints
that arise later in this paper are of the form∑
x∈A
Wx,y ⊗ |x〉〈x| ⊗ IB  C,
where Wx,y are the variables and the objective function is continuous and nondecreasing on the
value of 〈φ|Wx,y|φ〉. We see that a necessary condition is∑
x∈A
〈φ|Wx,y|φ〉 · |x〉〈x| ⊗ IB  (〈φ| ⊗ IA ⊗ IB)C (|φ〉 ⊗ IA ⊗ IB).
By using a properly modified definition for Wx,y(δ), we have that this condition is also sufficient.
The idea is to increase the eigenvalues on subspaces that do not affect the objective function.
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D.1 On the structure of the proofs
Here we prove that the cheating SDPs can have a certain, restricted form while retaining the same
optimal objective function value. That is, we cut down the feasible region to something that is
much cleaner and illustrates the simple communication of the protocol. The main technique used
in proving that we do not cut off all of the optimal solutions comes from duality theory of semidef-
inite programming. We generalize the following idea. If we wish to prove that a certain feasible
solution is optimal for the primal problem, it suffices to exhibit a feasible dual solution with the
same objective function value. Here, we claim that a restricted feasible region contains an optimal
solution. Let p∗1 be the optimal value of the original SDP, p∗2 be the optimal value of the restricted
SDP, and let d∗1 and d∗2 be the optimal values of the respective dual problems and assume all of
them are finite. We want to show that p∗1 = p∗2. Suppose the restricted problem and its dual have
zero duality gap. Then if we can prove that d∗1 ≤ d∗2, we have
p∗1 ≤ d∗1 ≤ d∗2 = p∗2 ≤ p∗1,
proving p∗1 = p∗2 as desired. To show d∗1 ≤ d∗2, it suffices to find a restriction of the dual of the
original SDP to get to a problem equivalent to the dual of the restricted SDP. This is depicted in
Figure 12.
Dual of Original SDP
Dual Feasible Region
Restricted DualRestricted SDP
Primal Feasible Region
Original SDP
uOpt Sol’n
u
Opt Sol’n
Figure 12: There exist optimal solutions in the restricted feasible regions.
D.2 Proof of Theorem 3.4
The contexts of the “reduced strategies” are very simple, Alice or Bob simply change the proba-
bility of which the next message is chosen, controlled on the messages sent and received so far
(doing so in superposition). This is a very simple form, their cheating is certainly not limited to
such strategies. However, we show here that such strategies are optimal, starting with a cheating
Bob.
We now restrict the feasible region of Bob’s cheating SDPs by defining the following parame-
terized primal feasible solutions:
ρ¯j :=
∑
x1∈A1
· · ·
∑
xj∈Aj
|x1, . . . , xj〉〈x1, . . . , xj | ⊗ |ψx1,...,xj 〉〈ψx1,...,xj | ⊗Diag(pj),
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for j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and
ρ¯F :=
∑
a∈{0,1}
|aa〉〈aa| ⊗ |ψ′a〉〈ψ′a|,
where pj ∈ RA1×B1×···×Aj×Bj+ is a variable,
|ψx1,...,xj 〉 :=
1√
2
∑
xj+1∈Aj+1
· · ·
∑
xn∈An
∑
a∈{0,1}
√
αa,x |aa〉|xj+1, . . . , xn〉|xj+1, . . . , xn〉,
and
|ψ′a〉 :=
∑
y∈B
√
1
2
∑
x∈A
αa,x[pn]x,y |yy〉,
for all a ∈ {0, 1}. The new objective function for forcing outcome 0 becomes
〈ρ¯F ,ΠA,0〉 = 1
2
∑
a∈{0,1}
F
(
(αa ⊗ IA)>pn, βa
)
and the variables (p1, . . . , pn) belong to Bob’s cheating polytope as defined in Definition 3.3.
Since we have restricted the feasible region of a maximization SDP, we have proved that
P ∗B,0 ≥ max
12 ∑
a∈{0,1}
F
(
(αa ⊗ IB)>pn, βa
)
: (p1, . . . , pn) ∈ PB
 .
By changing the value of ρ¯F ∈ SA0×B
′
0×B×B′
+ above to ρ¯F =
∑
a∈{0,1} |aa¯〉〈aa¯| ⊗ |ψ′a〉〈ψ′a|, we get
P ∗B,1 ≥ max
12 ∑
a∈{0,1}
F
(
(αa ⊗ IB)>pn, βa¯
)
: (p1, . . . , pn) ∈ PB
 .
This swaps Bob’s choice of commitment reveal in the last message.
We now show that these inequalities hold with equality by exhibiting a family of feasible dual
solutions with matching optimal objective function value.
We begin by proving this for the case of P ∗B,0. Consider the dual of Bob’s cheating SDP below:
P ∗B,0 = inf 〈W1,TrA1 |ψ〉〈ψ|〉
subject to Wj ⊗ IBj  Wj+1 ⊗ IAj+1 ,
for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} ,
Wn ⊗ IBn  Wn+1 ⊗ IA′ ⊗ IA′0 ,
Wn+1 ⊗ IB′ ⊗ IB′0  ΠA,0,
Wj ∈ SA0×A′0×B1×···×Bj−1×Aj+1×···×An×A′ ,
for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n},
Wn+1 ∈ SA0×B.
We now define a restriction of the following form:
Wj :=
∑
x1∈A1
∑
y1∈B1
· · ·
∑
yj−1∈Bj−1
∑
xj∈Aj
|x1, y1, . . . , yj−1, xj〉〈x1, y1, . . . , yj−1, xj | ⊗Wj,x1,y1,...,yj−1,xj ,
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for j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and
Wn+1 :=
∑
a∈{0,1}
|a〉〈a| ⊗Diag(va).
Under this restriction, we have the following problem:
d∗2 = inf
∑
x1∈A1
〈W1,x1 , |ψx1〉〈ψx1 |〉
subject to Wj,x1,y1,...,yj−1,xj 
∑
xj+1
|xj+1〉〈xj+1| ⊗ IAj+1 ⊗Wj+1,x1,y1,...,yj ,xj+1 ,
for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} ,
(x1, . . . , xj) ∈ A1 × · · · ×Aj ,
(y1, . . . , yj) ∈ B1 × · · · ×Bj ,
Wn,x1,y1,...,yn−1,xn 
∑
a∈{0,1}
va,y |a〉〈a| ⊗ IA′0 ,
Diag(va) 
√
βa
√
βa
>
, for all a ∈ {0, 1},
where the last constraint was obtained using Lemma 2.4. Note that this shows d∗2 ≥ P ∗B,0.
The last constraint changes to Diag(va) 
√
βa¯
√
βa¯
>
, for all a ∈ {0, 1}, if Bob is cheating to-
wards 1 and the rest of the proof follows similarly in this case.
Since the objective function only depends on W1,x1 in the subspace |ψx1〉〈ψx1 |, we apply the
Subspace lemma (Lemma D.1) to the first constraint and replace it with
〈ψx1 |W1,x1 |ψx1〉 ≥ 〈ψx1 |
∑
x2∈A2
|x2〉〈x2| ⊗ IA2 ⊗W2,x1,y1,x2 |ψx1〉
=
∑
x2∈A2
〈ψx1,x2 |W2,x1,y1,x2 |ψx1,x2〉.
Examining the next constraint, we need to choose W2,x1,y1,x2 to satisfy
W2,x1,y1,x2 
∑
x3∈A3
|x3〉〈x3| ⊗ IA3 ⊗W3,x1,y2,x2,y2,x3 .
Since the objective function value only depends on 〈ψx1,x2 |W2,x1,y1,x2 |ψx1,x2〉, we can repeat the
same argument and replace the constraint by
〈ψx1,x2 |W2,x1,y1,x2 |ψx1,x2〉 ≥
∑
x3∈A3
〈ψx1,x2,x3 |W3,x1,y2,x2,y2,x3 |ψx1,x2,x3〉.
Continuing in this fashion, we can replace each constraint to get the following problem with the
54
same optimal objective value:
inf
∑
x1∈A1
〈W1,x1 , |ψx1〉〈ψx1 |〉
s.t. 〈ψx1,...,xj |Wj,x1,y1,...,yj−1,xj |ψx1,...,xj 〉 ≥
∑
xj+1
〈ψx1,...,xj+1 |Wj+1,x1,y1,...,yj ,xj+1 |ψx1,...,xj+1〉
for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} ,
(x1, . . . , xj+1) ∈ A1 × · · · ×Aj+1,
(y1, . . . , yj) ∈ B1 × · · · ×Bj ,
〈ψx|Wn,x1,y1,...,yn−1,xn |ψx〉 ≥
∑
a∈{0,1}
αa,x va,y, for all x ∈ A, y ∈ B,
Diag(va) 
√
βa
√
βa
>
, for all a ∈ {0, 1}.
Define
wj,x1,y1,...,yj−1,xj := 〈ψx1,...,xj |Wj,x1,y1,...,yj−1,xj |ψx1,...,xj 〉,
for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} , (x1, . . . , xj+1) ∈ A1 × · · · × Aj+1, (y1, . . . , yj) ∈ B1 × · · · × Bj , to get the
equivalent problem
d∗2 = inf
∑
x1∈A1
w1,x1
subject to wj,x1,y1,...,yj−1,xj ≥
∑
xj+1∈Aj+1
wj+1,x1,y1,...,yj ,xj+1 ,
for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} ,
(x1, . . . , xj+1) ∈ A1 × · · · ×Aj+1,
(y1, . . . , yj) ∈ B1 × · · · ×Bj ,
wn,x1,y1,...,yn−1,xn ≥
∑
a∈{0,1}
1
2
αa,x va,y, for all x ∈ A, y ∈ B, a ∈ {0, 1},
Diag(va) 
√
βa
√
βa
>
, ∀a ∈ {0, 1},
noting wj,x1,y1,...,yj−1,xj = 0 when |ψx1,...,xj 〉 = 0 can be assumed in an optimal solution. This
problem has a strictly feasible solution and the objective function is bounded from below on the
feasible region, thus strong duality holds and there is zero duality gap. The dual of this problem
is
max
(p1,...,pn)∈PB
ρ0,ρ1∈SB+
 ∑
a∈{0,1}
1
2
〈ρa,
√
βa
√
βa
>〉 : diag(ρa) = (αa ⊗ IB)>pn, ∀a ∈ {0, 1}
 ,
which has optimal value d∗2 due to zero duality gap. This problem is equivalent to the reduced
problem by Lemma 2.3. Therefore, we have P ∗B,0 ≤ d∗2 ≤ P ∗B,0 implying P ∗B,0 = d∗2 which is the
optimal value of the reduced problem, as desired. 
D.3 Proof of Theorem 3.7
We now restrict the feasible region of Alice’s cheating SDPs by defining the following parame-
terized primal feasible solutions. Intuitively, this strategy is similar to that of cheating Bob. The
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solution is given below
σ¯j :=
∑
y1∈B1
· · ·
∑
yj−1∈Bj−1
|y1, . . . , yj−1〉〈y1, . . . , yj−1| ⊗ |φy1,...,yj−1〉〈φy1,...,yj−1 | ⊗Diag(sj),
for j ∈ {2, . . . , n}, and
σ¯F :=
∑
a∈A′0
∑
y∈B
|a〉〈a| ⊗ |y〉〈y| ⊗ |φy〉〈φy| ⊗ |φ′a,y〉〈φ′a,y|,
where sj ∈ RA1×B1×···×Bj−1×Aj+ and s ∈ RA
′
0×A×B
+ are variables,
|φy1,...,yj−1〉 :=
1√
2
∑
yj∈Bj
· · ·
∑
yn∈Bn
∑
b∈{0,1}
√
βb,y |bb〉|yj , . . . , yn〉|yj , . . . , yn〉,
and
|φ′a,y〉 :=
∑
x∈A
√
sa,y,x |xx〉,
for all y ∈ B, a ∈ {0, 1}. With this restriction, we have
〈σ¯F ,ΠB,0 ⊗ IB′0×B′〉 =
1
2
∑
a∈A′0
∑
y∈B′
βa,y F(s
(a,y), αa)
as the new objective function for forcing outcome 0 where s(a,y) ∈ CA is defined as the restriction
of s with a and y fixed. We can define it element-wise as [s(a,y)]x := sa,y,x. The new objective
function for forcing outcome 1 is
〈σ¯F ,ΠB,1 ⊗ IB′0×B′〉 =
1
2
∑
a∈A′0
∑
y∈B′
βa¯,y F(s
(a,y), αa).
The variables (s1, . . . , sn, s) belong to Alice’s cheating polytope as defined in Definition 3.6.
We have proved
P ∗A,0 ≥ max
(s1,...,sn,s)∈PA
12 ∑
a∈{0,1}
∑
y∈B
βa,y F(s
(a,y), αa)

and
P ∗A,1 ≥ max
(s1,...,sn,s)∈PA
12 ∑
a∈{0,1}
∑
y∈B
βa¯,y F(s
(a,y), αa)
 .
We now show that the above inequalities hold with equality by exhibiting a family of feasible
dual solutions with matching optimal objective function value.
Consider the dual to Alice’s cheating SDP for forcing outcome 0, below:
P ∗A,0 = inf 〈Z1, |φ〉〈φ|〉
subject to Zj ⊗ IAj  Zj+1 ⊗ IBj ,
for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n} ,
Zn+1 ⊗ IA′ ⊗ IA′0  ΠB,0 ⊗ IB′0 ⊗ IB′ ,
Zj ∈ SB0×B′0×A1×···×Aj−1×Bj×···×Bn×B′ ,
for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n, n+ 1}.
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Consider the following restriction:
Zj+1 :=
∑
x1∈A1
∑
y1∈B1
· · ·
∑
xj∈Aj
∑
yj∈Bj
|x1, y1, . . . , xj , yj〉〈x1, y1, . . . , xj , yj | ⊗ Zj+1,x1,y1,...,xj ,yj ,
for j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Substituting this into the constraints, we get the following new problem
d∗2 = inf 〈Z1, |φ〉〈φ|〉
subject to Z1 
∑
y1∈B1
|y1〉〈y1| ⊗ IB1 ⊗ Z2,x1,y1 ,
Zj,x1,y1,...,xj−1,yj−1 
∑
yj∈Bj
|yj〉〈yj | ⊗ IBj ⊗ Zj+1,x1,y1,...,xj ,yj ,
for all j ∈ {2, . . . , n},
(x1, . . . , xj) ∈ A1 × · · · ×Aj ,
(y1, . . . , yj) ∈ B1 × · · · ×Bj ,∑
x∈A
Zn+1,x,y ⊗ |x〉〈x| ⊗ IA′  |a〉〈a| ⊗ IB′0 ⊗ |ψa〉〈ψa|, ∀a ∈ {0, 1}, y ∈ B.
This shows that d∗2 ≥ P ∗A,0. Applying the Subspace lemma (Lemma D.1) recursively, as in the case
for cheating Bob, we get the following problem with the same optimal objective value
inf 〈Z1, |φ〉〈φ|〉
s.t. 〈φy1,...,yj−1 |Zj,x1,y1,...,xj−1,yj−1 |φy1,...,yj−1〉 ≥
∑
yj∈Bj
〈φy1,...,yj |Zj+1,x1,y1,...,xj ,yj |φy1,...,yj 〉,
for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n},
(x1, . . . , xj) ∈ A1 × · · · ×Aj ,
(y1, . . . , yj) ∈ B1 × · · · ×Bj ,∑
x∈A
〈φy|Zn+1,x,y|φy〉 |x〉〈x| ⊗ IA′  12βa,y |ψa〉〈ψa|, for all a ∈ {0, 1}, y ∈ B.
Defining
zj+1,x1,y1,...,xj ,yj := 〈φy1,...,yj |Zj+1,x1,y1,...,xj ,yj |φy1,...,yj 〉,
for j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n− 1}, (x1, . . . , xj) ∈ A1 × · · · ×Aj , and (y1, . . . , yj) ∈ B1 × · · · ×Bj , and
Diag(z
(y)
n+1) :=
∑
x∈A
〈φy|Zn+1,x,y|φy〉 |x〉〈x|,
for y ∈ B, we get the following equivalent problem
d∗2 = inf z1
subject to zj,x1,y1,...,xj−1,yj−1 ≥
∑
yj∈Bj
zj+1,x1,y1,...,xj ,yj ,
for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n},
(x1, . . . , xj) ∈ A1 × · · · ×Aj ,
(y1, . . . , yj) ∈ B1 × · · · ×Bj ,
Diag(z
(y)
n+1)  12βa,y
√
αa
√
αa
>, for all y ∈ B, a ∈ {0, 1},
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noting zj+1,x1,y1,...,xj ,yj = 0 when |φy1,...,yj 〉 = 0 can be assumed in an optimal solution. This
problem has a strictly feasible solution and the objective function is bounded from below on the
feasible region, thus it and its dual have zero duality gap. The dual of this problem is
max
(s1,...,sn,s)∈PA
σa,y∈SA+
12 ∑
a∈{0,1}
∑
y∈B
βa,y〈σa,y,√αa√αa>〉 : diag(σa,y) = s(a,y), ∀a ∈ {0, 1}, y ∈ B

which is equivalent to Alice’s reduced problem for forcing outcome 0 by Lemma 2.3 and has
optimal objective value d∗2. Therefore, we have P ∗A,0 ≤ d∗2 ≤ P ∗A,0, as desired.
The case for forcing outcome 1 is almost the same, except every occurrence of αa is replaced
with αa¯. The above SDP thus becomes
max
(s1,...,sn,s)∈PA
σa,y∈SA+
12 ∑
a∈{0,1}
∑
y∈B
βa,y〈σa,y,√αa¯√αa¯>〉 : diag(σa,y) = s(a,y), ∀a ∈ {0, 1}, y ∈ B
 .
Since the last constraint is symmetric in a, we can replace s(a,y) with s(a¯,y) and σa,y with σa¯,y and
the optimal objective value does not change. We can write it as
max
(s1,...,sn,s)∈PA
σa,y∈SA+
12 ∑
a∈{0,1}
∑
y∈B
βa¯,y〈σa,y,√αa√αa>〉 : diag(σa,y) = s(a,y), ∀a ∈ {0, 1}, y ∈ B
 ,
which is equivalent to Alice’s reduced problem for forcing outcome 1 by Lemma 2.3 and the rest
of the argument follows similarly as in the case of Alice forcing outcome 0. 
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